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Minnesota's "Crack Baby" Law: Weapon of War
or Link in a Chain?
Judith M. Nyhus Johnson*
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extrava-
gant to endure. The World War II relocation-camp cases, and
the Red Scare and McCarthy-Era internal subversion cases are
only the most extreme reminders that when we allow funda-
mental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or per-
ceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it.1
Introduction
These are urgent times. Since Richard Nixon declared "war"
on drugs in the late 1960s, American presidents have grappled with
this difficult and widespread quasi-war.2 Now homes are filled
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1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1422 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989), the Court held that railway workers and
customs workers could be tested for drug use without individual suspicion or prob-
able cause. Justice Scalia commented on urine testing in his dissent:
The Court agrees that this constitutes a search for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment--and I think it obvious that it is a type of search
particularly destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity.
... I decline to join the Court's opinion in the present case be-
cause neither frequency of use nor connection to harm is demon-
strated or even likely. In my view the Customs Service rules are a
kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposi-
tion to drug use.
Id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. Return of the Hard-Drug Menace, U.S. News & World Rep., June 30, 1975,
at 29 ("The federal 'war' on drugs, launched by President Nixon in 1969, combined
a crackdown on drug traffickers with an expansion of facilities for treating addicts
.... .); Richard Cohen, Users, Washington Post, Dec. 26, 1982, at B1 ("[President
Reagan], as we all know has declared war on drugs.... Of course, Richard Nixon
did the same thing, as did Lyndon Johnson, and so did every president in mem-
ory."); Leonard Larsen, 'War on Drugs' -Here We Go, Newsday, Aug. 25, 1989, at
78 ("With the nation crouched once more in the trenches, poised again to go over
the top when President George Bush soon declares his own version of the war on
drugs, there's time to reflect on the battle so far.")
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with broadcast scenes of battle. Crack-house walls crushed by po-
lice-driven bulldozers, special force police kicking in apartment
doors, anonymous suspects lying face down on the sidewalk-all
have become almost routine television fare. Streets in some cities
resound with echos of drug dealers' automatic weapons. Most of
the civilian population observes this war with fear-fear of drug-
users and fear of the crimes they commit to feed their addictions.
3
Beyond fear, the body politic expresses increasing outrage at the
social damage wrought by drug abuse and increasing anger at the
abusers themselves. 4
Against this background of increasing anger, an incident that
occurred in the summer of 1989 galvanized public opinion in Min-
nesota. On August 5, a nurse at St. Paul's United Hospital found a
patient, Gayle Turenne, injecting cocaine into her wrist either as
she was giving birth or shortly afterward.5 The woman was later
charged with and convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced
to a prison term of twenty-six months.6 The state's sentencing
guidelines, however, called for only a probationary term for simple
possession of cocaine.7 Judge James Campbell explained that the
3. E.g., David Musto, America's Forgotten Drug War, Wilson Q., Summer
1989, at 59.
For years, the District of Columbia's chief of police, Major Sylvester,
had been warning Congress .. .of cocaine's horrifying effects. "The
cocaine habit is by far the greatest menace to society, because the vic-
tims are generally vicious.... The use of this drug prodisposes [sic]
[people] to commit criminal acts[.]" In 1909, President Theodore
Roosevelt's Homes Commission presented the testimony of Sylvester
and other officials to an alarmed Congress, which promptly restricted
legal drug sales in the nation's capital.
Id. at 63-64.
4. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text for community reaction to one
cocaine abuser.
5. Conrad deFiebre, Harsh Sentence Imposed on Woman Who Injected Co-
caine While Giving Birth, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Oct. 20, 1989, at 1B, col. 1.
Ramsey County District Judge James Campbell said Turenne's son was born pre-
maturely with cocaine in his system. Id. Turenne denied using cocaine before the
child's birth:
She pleaded guilty Aug. 31 to possession of the drug, but maintained
that the syringe incident occurred after the child was born.
She also told authorities that the child was born prematurely be-
cause she had changed a tire on her car, not because of drug use. But
she admitted inhaling cocaine while in labor.
Id. at 4B, col. 3.
6. Id. at 1B, col. 1.
7. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines & Commentary IV (rev. ed. 1988), reprinted in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244
app. (West Supp. 1989). According to the sentencing guidelines, possession of co-
caine under Minn. Stat. § 152.15 subd. 2(1) carries an offense severity of II. Id. at
398. The severity scale ranges from I, which includes possession of marijuana, to
level X, which includes second degree murder with intent. See id. at 395-99. First
degree murder is excluded from the guidelines. Id. at 396. If Turenne had no crim-
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woman's crime justified the severity of the sentence because her
act was "roughly akin to distributing cocaine in a schoolyard"8 and
"[u]nlike most cocaine offenses, there was a victim in this case."9
Four days after the Turenne story broke, WCCO radio, the
Twin Cities' AM giant, posed a related question on its state-wide,
informal telephone survey: would listeners "support more govern-
ment funding to battle cocaine addiction among pregnant wo-
men?" 10 By the end of the approximately half-hour calling period,
eighty-nine percent of the 143 individuals responding had voted
"no" to more government funding."1 Although the radio station
makes no claims of scientific accuracy for any of its informal
surveys, the overwhelmingly negative response suggests an emo-
tion in the callers more basic than the instinct to pay lower taxes.
Later that fall, when the Turenne story was no longer front-
inal history, the presumptive sentence for her current offense would be a year and
a day. See id. at 395. At the discretion of the judge, up to a year in jail and/or
other non-jail sanctions can be imposed as conditions of probation. Id.
8. deFiebre, supra note 5, at 1B, col. 1.
9. Id.
10. Telephone interview with Steve Murphy, Morning News Editor at WCCO
radio (Feb. 27, 1990). The station asked the question on August 9, 1989. Murphy
states that the 143 callers during the half-hour phone-in period is an average
number of callers. A columnist for the Minneapolis newspaper described the re-
sults of the WCCO radio survey and the anger directed toward Turenne personally.
The Good Neighbor's [WCCO] listeners weren't the only angry people.
In a letter to [Judge] Campbell, Turenne wrote of the wrath that she
was surrounded by, even in jail.
"...My mother received bad phone calls," Turenne wrote. "Peo-
ple drive by my house yelling terrible things. My life has been
threatened countless times and now I'm sitting in the Ramsey County
detention center with inmates that treat me as if I were dirt. .
Earlier this week Campbell said he was second-guessing himself
almost from the moment he handed down the initial harsh sentence.
"It's tough to admit you goofed," said the 40-year-old judge ....
Campbell is not naive. He knows that the statistics surrounding
efforts to treat cocaine addicts "are dismal." He also knows, better
than most, that drugs are tearing families and communities apart. His
docket is full and the majority of the cases coming before him have a
drug tie-in.
Doug Grow, Judge Turns From Anger, Hoping to Help Addicted Mother, Minneapo-
lis Star Tribune, Nov. 10, 1989, at 1B col. 5.
Several months before Turenne gave birth, she had been convicted of drug pos-
session. Officials of two counties, Dakota and Isanti, bickered over which county's
funds would pay for the drug rehabilitation ordered by the judge in that case. Id. at
4B, col. 2. As a result, Turenne did not get the help she needed. Grow reported:
Campbell is not blaming either of the counties for their reluctance to
pay the bills. "There is a financial crisis out there and there's a fund-
ing crisis for drug treatment," he said.
Still, the system had ordered Turenne to get treatment and then
the system had failed to get her the treatment it said she needed.
Id.
11. Murphy, supra note 10.
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page news, Judge Campbell reduced his original sentence to six
months in the workhouse and five years of probation. He ordered
also that Turenne attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings during
the probation.12 "That a woman is injecting in the delivery room
is outrageous," the judge said, but he had changed Turenne's sen-
tence because "[ilt is also outrageous that a pregnant woman can't
get treatment for an addiction."13 Judge Campbell's change in fo-
cus from his early anger at Gayle Turenne's act to his later show-
ing of compassion for her, to his eventual directing of outrage
toward the criminal justice and health care systems which denied
her help, illustrate the difficulties inherent in finding a right an-
swer to the problem of a single individual's drug abuse. Finding
answers to an entire group's drug problem presents proportion-
ately more difficulties.
Before the Turenne incident, Dr. Virginia Lupo, a resident
physician at Hennepin County Medical Center, completed a study
designed to assess the extent of drug use in the group to which Tu-
renne belonged: women in labor and delivery. Between April 1,
1989 and June 30, 1989, Dr. Lupo conducted a test of 200 blinded
urine samples from a group of 1800 women present in nine Minne-
apolis and St. Paul hospitals.14 The samples were tested for am-
phetamines, benzodiazepines, cannabis, barbiturates, and cocaine.
The results of the tests showed no evidence of amphetamine use,
but some presence of opiates and barbiturates. After eliminating
the other drugs, Lupo found evidence of cocaine and cannabis in
the urine samples in 2.9% and 7%, respectively.15
Because she observed in the course of her work evidence of
drug abuse among pregnant women-evidence she later verified
with her study-Dr. Lupo, along with the Hennepin County Attor-
ney's Office, became instrumental in lobbying the Minnesota Leg-
islature to pass what she calls a "darn good law."'16 The result,
popularly known as the "Crack Baby" bill, was passed as part of
12. Grow, supra note 10, at 1B, col. 5.
13. Id. at 4B, col. 1. Turenne was "expelled from her most recent cocaine treat-
ment program ... Oct. 2, after stealing from a hospital gift shop." deFiebre, supra
note 5, at 1B, col. 2.
14. Virginia Lupo, "Born Addicted?" Symposium sponsored by Minnesota Med-
ical Ass'n., Minnesota Hospital Ass'n., Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (Jan. 17, 1990).
15. Id. Dr. Lupo's data is as follows:
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the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1989.17 Though the bill relates to many
kinds of crime, Article Five of the bill specifically addresses "Pre-
natal Exposure to Certain Controlled Substances."18 The Article
concerns the use of five named street drugs and substances listed
in Schedules I, II, and III. The Schedules list hundreds of drugs
which could potentially be abused--drugs with or without cur-
rently accepted medical uses in treatment.19 Among other things,
17. 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 290.
18. 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 290, Art. 5. This section, popularly known as the
"Crack Baby" bill, was sponsored by Senator Ember Reichgott and Representative
Kathy Blatz. A similar bill was introduced by Senator Jim Ramstad. Interested
groups testifying in favor of passage were the Children's Defense Fund, Minnesota
Department of Health, Minnesota Medical Association, and the Hennepin County
Attorney's Office. Telephone interview with Dr. Lupo, Hennepin County Medical
Center (Oct. 20, 1989).
19. Minn. Stat. § 152.02 (1988). The statute strikingly omits the most commonly
abused chemical, alcohol, although the dangers that excessive use of alcohol poses
to the developing fetus have been known to the scientific community since at least
1973. Ernest Abel, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Fetal Alcohol Effects 24 (1984)
(citing P. Lemoine, H. Harousseau, J.P. Borteryu, J.C. Menuet, Les enfants de par-
ents alcooliques: Anomalies observdes d propose de 127 cas., 21 Ouest M&lical 476
(1968) (children born to alcoholic mothers showed distinctive pattern of anomalies);
K. Jones, D. Smith, C. Ulleland, A. Streissguth, Pattern of MaUformation in Off-
spring of Chronic Alcoholic Mothers, 1 Lancet 1267 (1973) (study brought fetal alco-
hol syndrome to international attention)). "Crack" and cocaine, on the other hand,
have a relatively short history of abuse during this epidemic, and studies of chil-
dren who were exposed prenatally are, of necessity, still being done. American Col-
lege of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Statement on Substance Abuse and
Pregnancy before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, U.S.
House of Representatives (Oct. 16, 1987). Dr. Lupo calls the omission of alcohol one
"weakness of the law." Lupo, supra note 14. Legislative sponsors of the bill, how-
ever, either were not aware that alcohol poses a problem, or they believed that in-
cluding a legal chemical on the list of substances would make the bill too
controversial and therefore impossible to pass. Lupo, supra note 14 (comments of
Sen. Reichgott and Rep. Blatz).
Although a state need not tackle every aspect of a problem, one might wonder
why the statute does not cover alcohol. For a presentation of the detrimental ef-
fects of alcohol use during pregnancy, see Michael Dorris, The Broken Cord (1989).
Dorris describes his struggle to raise an adopted child whose capacities for develop-
ment were determined long before birth, after Adam was conceived and grown in
an "ethanol bath." Id. at 264. Adam's symptoms include grand mal seizures, learn-
ing disabilities, and an inability to project future consequences from present ac-
tions. The author describes his son's inability to learn from experience: "He could
not, cannot project himself into the future: 'If I do x, then y (good or bad) will fol-
low.' . .. He existed in the present tense, with occasional reference to past prece-
dent." Id. at 201.
Dorris believes that many of the mothers of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome children
suffer from the syndrome themselves or from Fetal Alcohol Effect and are not able
to associate their own heavy drinking with damage to their offspring. "I kept com-
ing back to the obvious deduction that fetal alcohol victims were behaviorally
among the most likely people to reproduce fetal alcohol victims. For them, logical
argumentation had the least sway." Id. at 179. Dorris believes that such women,
because they cannot connect their actions with consequences, are "impervious to
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the bill orders the following changes in state law relating to preg-
nant women:
1. It amends the definition of "chemically dependent" under
the civil commitment statute to include pregnant women
who habitually and excessively use cocaine, heroin,
phencyclidine (PCP), methamphetamine, or amphetamine
"during the pregnancy";20
2. It amends the definition of neglect in the child abuse stat-
ute to include prenatal exposure to a controlled substance,
as evidenced by toxicology tests on mother and child at the
time of delivery or developmental delays in the child's first
year of life. Drugs included are from Schedules I, II, and
III. The law also provides immunity from suit to medical
personnel who administer the toxicology test without con-
sent of the patient;21
3. It requires a pregnant woman's attending physician to con-
duct toxicology testing during prenatal care without con-
sent "if the woman has obstetrical complications that are a
medical indication" 22 of possible use of Schedule I, II, and
III drugs;23
educational efforts." Interview with Michael Dorris, Everyday Program (NBC tele-
vision broadcast, Oct. 27, 1989).
The Broken Cord contains an extensive bibliography on the subject of Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome and Fetal Alcohol Effect. The book itself focuses on the prob-
lem of chronic alcohol abuse in the Native American population. See also Anastasia
Shkilnyk, A Poison Stronger Than Love: The Destruction of an Ojibwa Commu-
nity (1985). Shkilnyk writes about the cultural and genetic damage brought about
by increasing alcohol use after a community's disruption:
At Grassy Narrows, the "catastrophic response" of women to the social
and economic order of the new reserve is manifest in various ways.
More than three-quarters of the women between the ages of thirty and
fifty are very heavy drinkers. Only four of the thirty-three women in
this age group are employed. The greatest incidence of child abandon-
ment, neglect and child abuse is found among the families of women
in their middle years. These women have stopped "caring for to-
morrow." More important, in not caring for their own offspring, they
have produced another generation of women who have no role models
to follow in caring for their offspring.
Id. at 160-61. See also Thomas Mails with Dallas Chief Eagle, Fools Crow (1979) (a
document of the life and times of Frank Fools Crow, medicine man of the Oglala
tribe of Dakota Indians, born 1890-91). Fools Crow recounts the years between 1930
and 1940 at Pine Ridge, a time when he could foresee the dangers of alcohol:
Our family structure was crumbling because independence and irre-
sponsibility were being encouraged among the young people. Bootleg-
gers were after the Indian's money, and were hauling cheap wine and
whiskey onto the reservation by the truckload. Our young men were
being persuaded to sell liquor for them, and as a result it was not long
before drunken people were trading every worthwhile thing they had
for liquor. Even the young women were drinking now, and this as-
sured a future tragedy of the worst possible proportions.
Id. at 148.
20. Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 2 (Supp. 1989).
21. Minn. Stat. § 626.5562, subd. 2(c) (Supp. 1989).
22. Minn. Stat. § 626.5562, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989).
23. Minn. Stat. § 626.5561, subd. 4 (Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 8:485
MINNESOTA'S "CRACK BABY" LAW
4. It mandates reporting of substance abuse by all those indi-
viduals required to report under the child abuse statute
with the addition of the local welfare agency;24
5. It requires the local welfare agency to offer services, in-
cluding chemical dependency referrals for assessment or
treatment and referrals for prenatal care, to the woman re-
ported. The welfare agency may also act under the civil
commitment statute, using emergency admission proce-
dures if necessary. The commitment provisions are to take
effect if the pregnant woman "refuses recommended vol-
untary services or fails recommended treatment."25
One sponsor of the Crack Baby bill sees this law as a form of
"preemptive strike" against forces ready and willing to pass laws
punishing pregnant women for their addiction.26 Dr. Lupo articu-
lated the reasons for the law as she believes physicians see it. The
"sentiment of the law," she said, is to "identify babies at risk of go-
ing to a home where drugs are being abused."27 There is evidence
that the Legislature did not share this sentiment.28
The legislative intent may have been that this law deter fu-
ture abuse or that it punish abusers. The bill originated not in the
Committees on Health and Human Services, but in the Judiciary
Committees of both houses of the Legislature. The provisions be-
came part of the Omnibus Crime Bill, an act "relating to crime." 29
Notwithstanding its origins, if this is a public health law, what
then would be the articulable state interest in this particular law?
One state interest may be the conservation of medical resources.
Babies with low birth weights, babies born prematurely, and chil-
dren with disabilities require expensive, often long-term, care.
Another state interest may be to protect the fetus. Were the
health of the mother of primary concern, no need would arise for a
separate classification for pregnant women under the civil commit-
ment statute.
If the Legislature has expressed a state interest in conserving
resources and protecting the fetus, the statute itself addresses the
reach of the state in guarding those interests. First, the Legisla-
24. Minn. Stat. § 626.5561, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989). See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd.
10 (Supp. 1989); Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 3 (1988).
25. Minn. Stat. § 626.5561, subd. 2 (Supp. 1989).
26. Lupo, supra note 14 (comment of Rep. Kathy Blatz). Dr. Lupo mentioned
United States Senator Pete Wilson of California, who believes pregnant women
who use drugs should be sentenced to three years in prison. Id. (comment of Dr.
Lupo). Representative Blatz said that she "always wanted the treatment." Id.
(comment of Rep. Blatz).
27. Id.
28. See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
29. 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 290.
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ture authorized a "massive curtailment of liberty"3 0 through the
civil commitment process 31 using a standard that applies only to
pregnant women. Civil detention, whether intended as punish-
ment or not, does punish women who fail to abstain from drugs.
Whether the statute is nominally regulatory or criminal, the depri-
vation of the individual's liberty is the same.32 Second, a woman's
personal physician must test for drug use during prenatal care; it is
the responsibility of the physician, acting as an agent of the state,
to decide if there is probable cause to test a urine sample.33
Although the cost of the test will be included in the patient's bill
for services,34 the law requires that it be done without her consent.
Medical personnel also must test both mother and child at birth,
30. Virginia Hiday, Court Discretion: Application of the Dangerousness Stan-
dard in Civil Commitment, 5 L. & Hum. Behavior 275, 276 (1981).
31. The Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982 defines "chemically dependent
person" as:
any person (a) determined as being incapable of self-management or
management of personal affairs by reason of the habitual and exces-
sive use of alcohol or drugs; and (b) whose recent conduct as a result
of habitual and excessive use of alcohol or drugs poses a substantial
likelihood of physical harm to self or others as demonstrated by (i) a
recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others, (ii) evidence
of recent serious physical problems, or (iii) a failure to obtain neces-
sary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care.
Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 2 (1988).
Commitment proceedings, whether civil or criminal, are subject to both the
equal protection clause and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
The United States Supreme Court has not recognized pregnant women as a
suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974), the Court held that a state disability insurance program did not dis-
criminate invidiously against pregnant women by not providing benefits for disabil-
ity caused by normal pregnancy. Id. at 497-98. The state was refusing to insure a
particular risk, not the individuals who faced the risk. Id.
32. But cf United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). In that case the Court
stated: "The Bail Reform Act of 1984... allows a federal court to detain an arres-
tee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence
after an adversary hearing that no release conditions 'will reasonably assure.., the
safety of any other person and the community.'" Id. at 741 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(e) (1982 & Supp. III)).
Chief Justice Rehnquist states in the majority opinion:
As an initial matter, the mere fact that a person is detained does not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed
punishment. To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes
impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, we first look to
legislative intent. Unless Congress expressly intended to impose puni-
tive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on "whether
an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]."
Id. at 746-47 (citations omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168-69 (1963)).
33. Minn. Stat. § 626.5562, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989).
34. Lupo, supra note 14 (comment of Sen. Donna Peterson).
MINNESOTA'S "CRACK BABY" LAW
again without consent, for purposes of showing prenatal child
neglect.3 5
Each of these statutory provisions implicitly presumes that
fetal neglect and child neglect are one and the same. The persons
mandated to report abuse are the same. For example, medical pro-
fessionals, teachers, social workers, or volunteers must report sus-
pected neglect to the police, the welfare agency, or the county
sheriff.3 6 A duty to report arises "if the person knows or has rea-
son to believe that a woman is pregnant and has used a controlled
substance for a nonmedical purpose during the pregnancy."37 If
the Legislature intended to recognize a duty to report at any time
during the pregnancy, it has in essence pushed back the reach of
the statute to the time of conception. Where lines will be drawn in
the future and where in the present this statute fits into the
medico-legal context remain unanswered questions. This essay ad-
dresses both.
Part I explores the informed consent doctrine as a baseline
for the physician-patient relationship.38 Related to informed con-
sent is the judicial recognition of the patient's right of personal au-
tonomy and the constitutional right of privacy. Part II discusses
the growing trend toward non-consensual medical care for preg-
nant women.3 9 Part III explores the rights of the fetus the law
now recognizes and the possible consequences of recognizing fetal
"personhood."40 Part IV discusses the dangers to maternal free-
dom that changes in technology have caused.41 This essay con-
cludes42 that in weighing the interests of the three competing
claimants on the lives of pregnant women represented by the
Crack Baby law--claims by law, medicine, and the individual wo-
man-it is best in the end to give women "a quit-claim deed to
35. Minn. Stat. § 626.5562, subd. 2 (Supp. 1989) (mandating test of the newborn).
Although there is some ambiguity about testing the mother at birth, the child ne-
glect provision provides that both mother and child be tested:
"Neglect" includes prenatal exposure to a controlled substance, as de-
fined in section 626.5561, used by the mother for a nonmedical pur-
pose, as evidenced by withdrawal symptoms in the child at birth,
results of a toxicology test performed on the mother at delivery or the
child at birth ....
Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd. 2(c) (Supp. 1989).
36. Minn. Stat. § 626.5561, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989). See Minn. Stat. § 626.556, subd.
3 (1988).
37. Minn. Stat. § 626.5561, subd. 1 (Supp. 1989).
38. See infra notes 44-75 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 76-154 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 155-201 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 203-228 and accompanying text.




I. The Informed Consent Doctrine
The Legislature recognized that the Crack Baby law's testing
requirements are a significant departure from the established doc-
trine of informed consent to medical treatment. To compensate,
the Crack Baby law specifically provides immunity from liability
for medical personnel who test women for evidence of drug
abuse.44 This section examines the reasons for the doctrine, some
problems in its application, and finally the status of informed con-
sent under Minnesota law.
The doctrine of informed consent demonstrates the common
law's respect for individual autonomy. The right to personal space
is a venerable tenet of the Anglo-American legal tradition.45 Un-
consented touching, whether harmful or offensive, may give rise to
a legal cause of action.46 Hostile intent on the part of the offender
is not an element of the action; the gist of the tort is contact with
the plaintiff's person without the plaintiff's consent.47
As early as 1914, Justice Cardozo commented on unconsented
touching in a suit for damages where the plaintiff had consented to
a medical examination but had not consented to the surgery physi-
cians performed while she was anesthetized.48 Cardozo stated in
dictum:
In the case at hand, the wrong complained of is not merely
negligence. It is trespass. Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he
is liable in damages. This is true, except in cases of emergency
where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to
operate before consent can be obtained.49
The American Medical Association's current opinions on
medical ethics5O recognize the primacy of the right of an adult of
sound mind to withhold or give consent to medical procedures and
43. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address on the Divorce Bill, in An American Pri-
mer 374 (Daniel Boorstin ed. 1966).
44. Minn. Stat. § 626.5562, subd. 4 (Supp. 1989).
45. William Prosser & W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts
§ 9, at 39 (5th ed. 1984).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 40-41.
48. Schloendorf v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
49. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93 (citations omitted).
50. American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Cur-
rent Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medi-
cal Association (1986) [hereinafter Current Opinions].
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most states have codified the right.51 The Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association spells out the
informed consent doctrine, which includes the physician's duty to
inform, and the patient's right to grant or withhold consent as well
as the two exceptions to the rule: when a patient is unconscious or
otherwise unable to consent, or when disclosing the risk poses a
serious psychological threat to the patient.5 2 Section 8.07 of the
Council's opinion states:
The patient's right of self-decision can be effectively exercised
only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an
intelligent choice. The patient should make his [or her] own
determination on treatment. The physician's obligation is to
represent the medical facts accurately to the patient or to the
individual responsible for his [or her] care and to make recom-
mendations for management in accordance with good medical
practice .... Social policy does not accept the paternalistic
view that the physician may remain silent because divulgence
might prompt the patient to forego needed therapy. Rational
informed patients should not be expected to act uniformly,
even under similar circumstances, in agreeing to or refusing
51. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 144.651 (1988) (the Minnesota Patient's Bill of Rights). A
"patient" is "a person who is admitted to an inpatient facility for a period longer
than 24 hours .... Id., subd. 2. The Patient's Bill of Rights provides:
Subd. 9 - Information about treatment. Patients and residents
shall be given by their physicians complete and current information
concerning their diagnosis, treatment, alternatives, risks, and progno-
sis as required by the physician's legal duty to disclose. This informa-
tion shall be in terms and language the patients or residents can
reasonably be expected to understand.... This information shall in-
clude the likely medical or major psychological results of the treat-
ment and its alternatives....
Subd. 12 - Right to refuse care. Competent patients and residents
shall have the right to refuse treatment based on the information re-
quired in subdivision 9. Residents who refuse treatment, medication,
or dietary restrictions shall be informed of the likely medical or major
psychological results of the refusal, with documentation in the individ-
ual medical record.
Section 144.652 concerns violations of the patient's rights:
Subd. 2. Correction order; emergencies. A substantial violation of
the rights of any patient or resident as defined in section 144.651, shall
be grounds for issuance of a correction order pursuant to section
144.653 or 144A.10. The issuance or nonissuance of a correction order
shall not preclude, diminish, enlarge, or otherwise alter private action
by or on behalf of a patient or resident to enforce any unreasonable
violation of the patient's or resident's rights. Compliance with the pro-
visions of section 144.651 shall not be required whenever emergency
conditions, as documented by the attending physician in a patient's
medical record or a resident's care record, indicate immediate medical
treatment, including but not limited to surgical procedures, is neces-
sary and it is impossible or impractical to comply with the provisions
of section 144.651 because delay would endanger the patient's or resi-
dent's life, health, or safety.
52. Current Opinions, supra note 50, at 32.
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treatment.5
One writer calls the informed consent doctrine "an unnatural
graft onto medical practice" and an obligation "alien to medical
thinking and practice."5 4 In earlier times, the absence of a physi-
cian's legal duty to disclose may have been the result of a societal
recognition that when there are few alternatives for treatment,
the medical knowledge the patient and the physician possess may
be more equal. The lack of an obligation to disclose may have
risen from a long history of medical paternalism or the individual
physician's urge, desire, and resolve to help other people.55 The
physician's resolve to help the patient who is already present in
the office or hospital may, however, conflict with the patient's
wish to be treated as a rational being capable of making informed
decisions.
Two conflicting principles guide the discussion of informed
consent: autonomy and beneficence.
The principle of autonomy declares that each person is in con-
trol of his own person, including his body and mind. This prin-
ciple, in its purest form, presumes that no other person or
social institution ought to intervene to overcome a decision
made by a person about himself, whether or not that decision
is "right" from any external perspective. 5 6
The assertive patient may believe that "my body's nobody's body
but mine" 5 7 and come into conflict with the physician, who should
by inclination and training be guided by the principle of
beneficence.
[This principle] declares that what is best for each person
should be accomplished. The principle incorporates both the
negative obligation of nonmaleficence ("primum non
nocere"-first of all, do no harm-the foundation of the Hippo-
cratic oath) and the positive obligation to do that which is
good. Thus, [physicians are obliged], under the principle of be-
53. Id.
54. Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 1 (1984), quoted in Barry
Furrow, Sandra Johnson, Timothy Jost & Robert Schwartz, Health Law 231 (1987)
[hereinafter Furrow].
55. Richard Zaner, Ethics and the Clinical Encounter (1988). Zaner emphasizes
the physician's resolve to help the patient:
Medical practice is guided by the moral resolve of physicians to put
their knowledge, experience, time, and talents at the disposal of dis-
tressed or damaged persons, individually or as groups. The resolve to
help other people (who are in need of help, ask for help, or are unable
to help themselves) is governing- to interpret an afflicted person's
presenting symptoms with the aim of attempting to correct, restore, or
comfort, to the extent possible in particular circumstances.
Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
56. Furrow, supra note 54, at 827.
57. Peter Alsop, Draw the Line, Flying Fish Record Co. (1979) (song lyric).
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neficence, to provide the highest quality of medical care for
each of [their] patients6 s
The law currently recognizes autonomy as the first principle in
medical decision-making and beneficence as the second.
5 9
The United States Supreme Court considered the question of
patient autonomy in the context of a fourth amendment search
and seizure case in which the police requested surgical removal of
a bullet from a suspect's body.60 The Court held that major sur-
gery under anesthesia without consent is not a reasonable search. 61
The Court noted that surgery done without a patient's consent "in-
volves a virtually total divestment of [the individual's] ordinary
control over surgical probing beneath his skin." 62 Procedures in-
volving a "slight intrusion," such as blood tests, do not present any
constitutional problems for the Court if the police have established
probable cause to arrest.63
In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the right
of a committed, mentally-ill patient to reject some forms of medi-
cal treatment.64 After discussing the "emerging right" of privacy
under the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court's
line of privacy cases, the Minnesota court concluded that intrusive
forms of treatment may not be left to the discretion of medical
personnel.6 5 The court explained its understanding of the privacy
right:
At the core of the privacy decisions, in our judgment, is the
58. Furrow, supra note 54, at 827.
59. Id.
60. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
61. Id. at 766.
62. Id. at 765. The Court stated:
When conducted with the consent of the patient, surgery requiring
general anesthesia is not necessarily demeaning or intrusive. In such a
case, the surgeon is carrying out the patient's own will concerning the
patient's body and the patient's right to privacy is therefore preserved.
In this case, however,... the Commonwealth proposes to take control
of respondent's body, to "drug this citizen-not yet convicted of a
criminal offense-with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of un-
consciousness," and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of a
crime. This kind of surgery involves a virtually total divestment of re-
spondent's ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin.
Id. at 765 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 901 (4th Cir. 1983).
63. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (upholding police taking a
blood sample from an unconscious person after a fatal automobile accident because
interest of society "in the scientific determination of intoxication" outweighed so
"slight an intrusion" as a blood test); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
768 (1966) (holding that possibility of delay in getting blood test from driver sus-
pected of driving while intoxicated justified police's taking blood sample as there
"was plainly probable cause to arrest and charge [the suspect]").
64. Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
65. Id. at 262, 239 N.W.2d at 913.
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concept of personal autonomy-the notion that the Constitu-
tion reserves to the individual, free of governmental intrusion,
certain fundamental decisions about how he or she will con-
duct his or her life. Like other constitutional rights, however,
this right is not an absolute one and must give way to certain
interests of the state, the balance turning on the impact of the
decision on the life of the individual. As the impact increases,
so must the importance of the state's interest....
But once justified, the extent of the state's intrusion is
not unlimited. It must also appear that the means utilized to
serve the state's interest are necessary and reasonable, or, in
other words, in light of alternative means, the least
intrusive.66
The court went on to formulate a procedure which would
serve the state's interest in providing health care for the commit-
ted patient and guard the patient's interest in making treatment
decisions. The procedure requires three steps: 1) a petition submit-
ted by the medical director of the mental health facility to the
county court requesting an order authorizing treatment, 2) ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem for the patient, and 3) an adver-
sarial proceeding in which the court determines the necessity and
reasonableness of the treatment.67 The Price court excluded mild
tranquilizers from the treatments requiring a court order, but it
specifically included nonconsensual psychosurgery and elec-
troshock as therapies requiring judicial approval.6 s
The Minnesota Supreme Court declared in 1987 that the Min-
nesota Bill of Rights protects the same fundamental rights as the
United States Constitution.69 A year later the court came down on
the side of personal autonomy for the committed mental patient.70
The court declared in Jarvis v. Levine, that "[i]ndeed, the final de-
cision to accept or reject a proposed medical procedure and its at-
tendant risks is ultimately not a medical decision, but a personal
choice."71
66. Id. at 257, 239 N.W.2d at 910.
67. Id. at 262, 239 N.W.2d at 910.
68. Id. at 263, 239 N.W.2d at 913.
69. State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987). The court held that the
Minnesota Bill of Rights protects the right of privacy, but no fundamental right ex-
ists under Minnesota Constitution to engage in sodomous acts for compensation.
Id. at 114.
70. Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
71. Id. at 148. The court goes on to say:
The practice of the various professions has been vastly changed in the
past quarter of a century. The public has been unwilling, quite prop-
erly, to allow professionals such as lawyers, doctors, dentists and
others a completely free hand in handling either a client, customer or
patient's case. Administering to a patient today may be more accu-
rately described as a team effort on the part of both the doctor and the
patient. It is a doctor's obligation to explain to the patient the diagno-
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The plaintiff, Jarvis, still considered mentally ill and danger-
ous, was retained by the Minnesota Security Hospital at St. Peter
after completing the sentence imposed for killing his sister.72
Jarvis refused treatment with psychotropic drugs which, he said,
were not helpful to him and caused serious side effects.7 3 In the
Jarvis appeal, the court considered whether state medical person-
nel may administer neuroleptic medication, without prior court ap-
proval, in non-emergency situations to a committed patient who
refuses consent. The court held that a committed mental patient,
although not legally competent to make all decisions, may be com-
petent to refuse consent to medical treatment and that the Price
procedure must be followed in non-emergency situations.74 The
court explained that "[a]n institutionalized patient should have the
same right [to refuse treatment] as one in a free and open society.
To deny mentally ill individuals the opportunity to exercise that
right is to deprive them of basic human dignity by denying their
personal autonomy."7 5
By requiring toxicological testing without the informed con-
sent of the patient, the Minnesota Legislature has presented an
ethical dilemma to medical personnel. They must, of course, obey
the law, but in obeying that law they are treating pregnant women
as incompetent persons with a lesser right to consent or withhold
consent than held by committed, mentally-ill individuals. A law
requiring that a woman be tested for drug use without informing
her is even more disturbing when one views it in the context of an
increasing trend of forced medical treatment after the pregnant
woman has withheld consent.
II. Nonconsensual Medical Treatment for Pregnant Women
Nonconsensual medical treatment for pregnant women is be-
coming more common. This section examines the reasons for that
trend and discusses the case law that attempts to define when such
treatment may be ordered. When discussing nonconsensual medi-
cal treatment of pregnant women, commentators often use a "slip-
pery slope" argument.76 For example, in her discussion of court-
sis and proposed method of treatment. The informed patient then de-
cides whether to consent to the treatment in whole or in part. The
doctor may recommend, but does not dictate the final decision.
Id. at 148.
72. Id. at 140.
73. Id. at 141.
74. Id. at 147.
75. Id. at 148.
76. See Patrick Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic (1988). Hurley de-
scribes a slippery slope argument:
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ordered Caesarean sections, Nancy Rhoden states:
Interventions such as brief involuntary hospitalization, testing,
or surveillance to control drinking, drug use, diet, etc., may be
viewed by some courts as less intrusive than major surgery-
though longer lasting, such interventions are, after all, much
less risky. Visions of a "slippery slope" progression appear
very real when one begins with mandatory major surgery.77
The slippery slope argument begins with evidence of court-ordered
Caesarean sections for competent adult women.78 Once noncon-
sensual major surgery receives documented medical and legal ac-
ceptance, other hypothetical steps on the slope lead to greater and
earlier interventions. Where Minnesota's Crack Baby law lies on
this hypothetical continuum is a matter for conjecture.
The reported cases, in which judges have considered and rati-
fied medical decisions, fall into three areas: 1) blood transfusions,79
2) Caesarean sections,8 0 and 3) other less physically invasive treat-
ments.S1 Until physicians and hospitals seek a court order, there is
no way of knowing how frequently pregnant women are given
treatment without their consent. Given the present legal climate,
one would have to speculate that such incidents are infrequent.8 2
The fallacy of slippery slope is a variety of the false cause fallacy. It
occurs when the conclusion of an argument rests upon the claim that a
certain event will set off a chain reaction, leading in the end to some
undesirable consequence, yet there is not sufficient reason to think
that the chain reaction will actually take place.
Id. at 128. Hurley also notes that the "[s]lippery slope is [a] fallacy that is some-
times difficult to evaluate. When the alleged chain reaction of events stretches the
imagination, there is usually no problem. A problem arises when there is some
likelihood that the chain reaction will actually occur." Id. at 159.
77. Nancy Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-
Ordered Cesareans, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1952, 2027 (1986).
78. See National Health Law Program, Court-Ordered Cesareans: A Growing
Concern for Indigent Women, 21 Clearinghouse Rev. 1064, 1070 (1988) [hereinafter
Nat'l Health Law Program].
79. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
80. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981).
81. See infra notes 134-144 and accompanying text.
82. But see Rhoden, supra note 77: "Hospital personnel are increasingly con-
templating a number of potentially involuntary treatments. I have participated in
ethics rounds at several hospitals in which the issue was whether a pregnant pa-
tient whose conduct was in some way harmful to the fetus could be forcibly hospi-
talized and treated." Id. at 2027 n.384. See also Veronika Kolder, Janet Gallagher
& Michael Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 New Eng. J. Med.
1192 (1987). In 1986, the authors sent questionnaires to two groups of obstetricians:
current heads of fellowship programs in maternal-fetal medicine and directors of
maternal-fetal medicine divisions in residency programs in obstetrics and gynecol-
ogy. Heads of fellowship programs, 57 total, responded in the following ways to
questions posed by the authors: 46% thought that mothers who refused medical
care and thereby endangered the fetus should be detained; 47% thought that court
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If one accepts as a general rule the requirement that medical deci-
sions for conscious, competent adults shall be made only with the
consent of the patient, decisions made without that consent must
come within some reasoned exception to the rule.
Judges who order medical treatment often use what is osten-
sibly a balancing test, balancing the woman's right of autonomy
and privacy against the state's interest in the fetus.83 In cases of
objections to medical care for religious reasons, which are most
often made by Jehovah's Witnesses, a first amendment right issue
arises. A woman may refuse blood transfusions because she be-
lieves that they are the moral equivalent of drinking blood, a prac-
tice her religion forbids on biblical grounds.84 A woman with
different religious beliefs may refuse treatment because she places
her trust in a spiritual power, not medicine.85 The judicial re-
orders to protect a fetus should be extended to procedures such as intrauterine
transfusions as these procedures become part of the medical standard of care; 26%
advocated state surveillance of women in the third trimester who stay outside the
hospital system. The percentage of respondents who consistently upheld a compe-
tent woman's right to refuse medical advice was 24%. Id. at 1193-94.
83. Rhoden, supra note 77, at 1998. Rhoden explores the ramifications of that
balancing test:
A court that compels surgical delivery will undoubtedly phrase its dis-
cussion in terms of the rights of the woman and the state interest in
the fetus. It may not think it is basing its decision on consequences,
rather than simply balancing the woman's rights against the fetus's
rights, or the state's interest in it. Yet, in an important sense its orien-
tation is consequentialist; it is letting the dire consequences to the fe-
tus "trump" the woman's rights of privacy, autonomy, and bodily
integrity. Significantly, in contrast to state impositions to promote a
larger and very public interest-the draft, for example--Cesarean
cases are unique in that the rights of one individual are subordinated
to protect another individual. The judicial decision to mandate such
subordination, rather than to respect the woman's refusal of it, exem-
plifies the consequentialist view that when the outcome of respecting a
right is very bad, the right can be overridden. The right-holder, then,
is treated as a means to achieving the better consequences.
Id.
84. See Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of Pennsylvania, Life Everlasting in
Freedom of the Sons of God 321-43 (1966). The Jehovah's Witnesses' proscription
against blood transfusions is based on both Old and New Testament scriptures and
is conceptually related to their refusal to shed blood on the battlefield. The tract
describes the rationale against blood transfusions:
Is It Cannibalism?
Today people in "civilized" lands shudder in horror at reports of
cannibals drinking human blood in various parts of the world, but they
take it as altogether different for themselves to receive transfusions of
human blood into their physical systems.... His [Jesus Christ's] fol-
lowers get the benefit of his shed blood, not by a blood transfusion, but
by exercising faith in the value of his blood.
Id. at 337-39.
85. See, e.g., Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 333, 446 N.E.2d 395, 396 (1983) ("[s]he
believes that Jesus Christ will help her and is confident and convinced that no
harm will come to her baby. She is sincere in her beliefs.").
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sponse to such objections often follows a standard form: first, reli-
gious freedom is defined as freedom to believe and not always to
act;8 6 second, parents may not deny conventional medical care to
their children because of their own religious beliefs;8 7 therefore, a
parent may not deny medical care to a fetus. Courts may also use
Roe v. Wade8 8 to justify decisions. If a woman has waived her con-
stitutional right to an abortion and the fetus is viable, the reason-
ing goes, the state has a compelling interest in protecting her fetus.
The court then may construe this interest to justify using force to
overcome a woman's firmly held beliefs.8 9
1. Court-Ordered Blood Transfusions
One 1964 state supreme court case is frequently cited as pre-
cedent for court-ordered blood transfusions. In Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,90 Williminia Ander-
son, a woman in her eighth month of pregnancy, began to hemor-
rhage and refused blood transfusions. The hospital sought a court
order authorizing a transfusion without Mrs. Anderson's consent.
The trial court held that the "judiciary could not thus intervene in
the case of an adult or with respect to an unborn child."91 The
New Jersey Supreme Court directed immediate arguments after
the hospital appealed.92 Although Mrs. Anderson had already left
the hospital against medical advice, the court heard arguments be-
cause the "parties request the court to determine the issues and
since it is likely that the matter would arise again at the instance
of an interested party .... ,"93 The court reversed the trial court's
ruling and directed the lower court to appoint a guardian for the
"infant," to substitute the guardian as party plaintiff, to order the
guardian to consent to blood transfusions, and to direct the mother
86. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ( "TIhe [first
amendment] embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society.").
87. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("Parents may be
free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free, in
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.").
88. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89. See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 614 (D.C. 1987) ("the right of a woman to
an abortion is different and distinct from her obligations to the fetus once she has
decided not to timely terminate her pregnancy"); see also ikfra text accompanying
notes 213-20.
90. 46 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
91. Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
92. Id., 201 A.2d at 538.
93. Id., 201 A.2d at 538.
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to submit to blood transfusions. Finally, the supreme court or-
dered the trial court to "restrain the defendant husband from in-
terfering therewith."94 Raleigh Fitkin is cited frequently because
it is a rare, published opinion concerning a court-ordered transfu-
sion. More often orders for transfusions are given over the tele-
phone and involve no published opinion.95
2. Court-Ordered Caesarean Sections
Published opinions about nonconsensual Caesarean sections
are equally rare. Evidence indicates that physicians in the United
States are performing surgical deliveries at an increasing rate96
and that the number of court-ordered procedures is rising as well.
The likelihood that a woman may undergo a Caesarean section
correlates to her socio-economic class.97 One study suggests that
the population undergoing the procedure is polarized:
[W]omen who have the highest incidence of Cesarean sections
are those with the least and most education, lowest and high-
est incomes, the youngest and oldest ages, fewest and most
pregnancies, those who have public insurance only or who
carry the most comprehensive private insurance, those who
have had no prenatal care at all and those who have had the
most extensive care, and women who use general municipal
hospitals and exclusive private hospitals.98
94. Id. at 424, 201 A.2d at 538.
95. Nat'l Health Law Program, supra note 78, at 1064. New York courts deliv-
ered two frequently cited opinions in 1985. One case involved blood transfusions.
Crouse Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443
(Sup. Ct. 1985) (ordering pregnant woman to receive blood transfusions to protect
welfare of fetus that was to be prematurely delivered). The second case involved
appointing a physician as guardian for the fetus. In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d
1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (appointing physician as guardian of an 18-
week-old fetus and ordering all that was necessary to save life of fetus, including
administering blood transfusions over mother's objection).
96. See Paul Placek & Selma Taffel, Recent Patterns in Cesarean Delivery in
the United States, 15 Obstetrics & Gynecology Clinics of N. Am. 607 (1988). The
Caesarean rate in 1970 was 5.5 per 100 live births. In 1986 the rate was 24.1. Id. at
609. The authors found the 1986 rate per 100 live births at 27.1 for patients insured
by Blue Cross, 20.8 for patients covered by Medicaid, and 18.7 for patients who were
uninsured. Id. at 613. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Cesarian Section in
America: Dramatic Trends, 1970 to 1987, Statistical Bull., Oct.-Dec. 1989, at 2. This
bulletin shows an overall Caesarean section rate of 24.4 per 100 deliveries in 1987.
Highest rates arose in the northeastern United States (26.4) and the South (25.5).
The midwestern rate was 23.2 and the western rate was 22.5. Id. at 5.
Using figures from the National Center for Health Statistics (Public Health
Service), compiled from 1965 to 1987, the bulletin projects a Caesarean section rate
of approximately 35 per 100 births in 1995 and over 40 per 100 births in the year
2000. The statistics were gathered from non-federal, short-stay hospitals in the
United States. Id. at 10.
97. See Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, supra note 82, at 1195.
98. Nat'l Health Law Program, supra note 78, at 1065 (citing Helen Marieskind,
An Evaluation of Caesarean Section in the United States (1979)).
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When surgery is court-ordered, low-income and minority women
are represented disproportionately. In one recent study of fifteen
requested court orders, courts granted all but one.99 Of the wo-
men concerned, 47% were black Americans, 33% were African or
Asian, and 20% were white Americans. 0 0
The most frequently cited case which a hospital petitioned for
a judicial order is Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospi-
tal.10 In that case Jessie Jefferson's physician diagnosed placenta
previa in her thirty-ninth week of pregnancy. 102 In placenta
previa, the placenta literally "goes before" the fetus and covers the
opening of the cervix, making vaginal delivery difficult and dan-
gerous for both mother and child.103 Ms. Jefferson's physician told
her that she would require both a Caesarean section and possible
blood transfusions.10 4 She refused on religious grounds.105 The
hospital petitioned the trial court, which authorized the Caesarean
section and any necessary blood transfusions "upon the defendant
... in the event she presented herself to the hospital for delivery
of her unborn child."106 The court granted custody of the unborn
child to the Georgia Department of Human Resources and the
County Children's Services Department.107 It granted power to
the Children's Services Department to make all decisions regard-
ing the birth of the child, including giving consent to surgical
99. Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, supra note 82, at 1193. Among 21 requests for
court-ordered intervention in obstetrical cases, orders were obtained in 86% of the
cases. Id. Of those cases, 81% involved women who were black, Asian, or Hispanic,
and 24% involved women who did not speak English as their primary language. Id.
All were treated in a teaching hospital or were receiving public assistance. Id.
100. Id.
101. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
102. Id. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458. Commentators favoring increased legal inter-
vention in pregnancy have extensively quoted both the Raleigh Fitkin and the Jef-
ferson cases. See, e.g., John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 Va. L. Rev. 405 (1983). Robertson also
alludes to the "slippery slope" argument:
These cases allow direct bodily intrusions to benefit a viable, full-term
fetus when the risks that the intervention poses to the mother are rea-
sonable. Although these cases involved saving both the fetus and the
mother's life, they lay the foundation for requiring a pregnant woman
to permit in utero fetal therapy essential to the health or survival of a
viable fetus, so long as the therapy does not pose substantial threats to
her life or health.
Id. at 445. For a discussion of the "slippery slope" argument, see supra notes 76-78
and accompanying text.
103. 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
104. Id., 274 S.E.2d at 458.
105. Id., 274 S.E.2d at 458.
106. Id., 274 S.E.2d at 458.
107. Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
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delivery.OS
The Georgia Supreme Court denied the Jeffersons a stay of
the trial court's order.l0 9 A concurring justice wrote to express
reservations about the power of the court to order a competent
adult to submit to surgery, a power he described as "nonexistent"
until this case.110 In affirming the trial court's order, the concur-
ring justice explained: "we weighed the right of the mother to
practice her religion . . . against her unborn child's right to live.
We found in favor of her child's right to live."111 Ms. Jefferson, as
the woman in Raleigh Fitkin, delivered normally without surgery
or transfusion, thus the court order was not carried out.112
The spectre of death haunts a more recent judicial opinion.
In In re A.C., Angela C. was twenty-five weeks pregnant and dying
of cancer.11 3 While hospitalized at George Washington University,
she agreed to treatment which might sustain her life until the
twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, a time when her fetus would
have a better chance of surviving a Caesarean delivery.114 When
medical personnel believed Angela's death was imminent, the hos-
pital sought a declaratory order from the District of Columbia Su-
perior Court to determine whether the hospital could intervene in
order to save the fetus.115 After a hearing at the hospital, the trial
court allowed the physicians to operate. 1 6 Earlier, after learning
of the court's decision, Angela C. had consented to surgery, but she
later withdrew her consent."17 Later the same day, following a tel-
ephone conference hearing, the appeals court denied the family's
motion for a stay."18 The mother and child both died shortly after
108. Id., 274 S.E.2d at 459.
109. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
110. Id., 274 S.E.2d at 460 (Hill, J., concurring). Justice Hill stated:
The power of a court to order a competent adult to submit to surgery
is exceedingly limited. Indeed, until this unique case arose, I would
have thought such power to be nonexistent. Research shows that the
courts generally have held that a competent adult has the right to re-
fuse necessary lifesaving surgery and medical treatment (i.e., has the
right to die) where no state interest other than saving the life of the
patient is involved.
Id., 274 S.E.2d at 460 (Hill, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 90, 274 S.E.2d at 460 (Hill, J., concurring).
112. George Annas, The Impact of Medical Technology on the Pregnant Wo-
man's Right to Privacy, 13 Am. J.L. & Med. 213, 224 (1987).
113. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988), rev'd,
573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
114. 533 A.2d at 612.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 613.
118. Id.
Law and Inequality [Vol. 8:485
the surgery.119
In analyzing precedent, the trial court had cited an earlier,
unreported District of Columbia case in which a court ordered a
Caesarean section when physicians believed an abnormally long la-
bor endangered the fetus.120 The trial court ordered the hospital
to take steps to "protect the birth and safety of the fetus," which
the appeals court affirmed. 121 The court also cited Roe v. Wade
and stated that "as a matter of law, the right of a woman to an
abortion is different and distinct from her obligations to the fetus
once she has decided not to timely terminate her pregnancy."'122
The court discussed the individual's right to bodily integrity and
cited cases requiring parents to provide medical care for their chil-
dren. The court came close to concluding that withholding treat-
ment from a fetus is no different from withholding treatment from
a child.123 After considering the dangers inherent in a Caesarean
section to a healthy woman, the death rate associated with Caesa-
rean sections, and the specific interests of both Angela C. and her
fetus, the court excluded the risk to the mother when balancing
the interests since she had only a short time to live under any
circumstances.124
The court necessarily rendered its decision, albeit not its writ-
ten opinion, in a very short period of time. Courts decide most re-
119. Id. at 612.
120. Id. at 613 n.1 (citing In re Maydun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233 (D.C.
Super. Ct. July 26, 1986) (affirmed by District of Columbia Court of Appeals by un-
reported order)).
121. Id. at 613 n.1.
122. Id. at 614.
123. Id. at 617.
124. Id. Contra Annas, supra note 112, at 225. George Annas discusses the
court's statement that the Caesarean section would not significantly affect A.C.'s
condition because she had at best two days of sedated life to live. Referring to the
court's weighing of Angela C.'s interest in her life, Annas says:
[Tihis reasoning will not do. It would, for example, permit the invol-
untary removal of vital organs prior to death if needed to "save a life."
But if the child had already been born, it is unlikely that any court
would compel the child's mother to undergo major surgery (e.g., a kid-
ney donation) no matter how dire the potential consequences of re-
fusal to the child. And no court would require the father of a child to
undergo surgery, even to save the child's life. The ultimate rationale
for the decision may be purely sexist: cesarean sections can never be
done on males, and these male judges are simply unable to identify
with the pregnant woman.
Annas, supra note 112, at 225. Annas has also observed that, "[t]he court actually
wound up forcing Angela C. to have an abortion prior to her death, since her fetus
was not viable." Id. at 225 n.59; see also Rhoden, supra note 77, at 1959 (discussing
a singular case in which a woman's refusal to undergo a Caesarean section was up-
held by a woman judge who had "an intuition that the delivery would turn out fine
despite the doctors' dire predictions"); Nat'l Health Law Program, supra note 78, at
1065-68 (discussing legal flaws inherent in Caesarean section orders).
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quests for court-ordered Caesarean sections under severe time
constraints. The District of Columbia court stated that because of
the time pressure and the court's lack of medical knowledge, such
decisions would be better made by an administrative agency, with
an opportunity for later judicial review.125 The court failed to con-
sider one other alternative: that the decision might be made by the
woman and her family.
Finally, on appeal taken because the case was "capable of rep-
etition, yet evading review,"'126 the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia took a more positive view, emphasizing the
woman's wishes and giving hope to women who suffer from condi-
tions like that of Angela C. The court held that "a court must de-
termine the patient's wishes by any means available, and must
abide by those wishes unless there are truly extraordinary or com-
pelling reasons to override them. When the patient is incompe-
tent, or when the court is unable to determine competency, the
substituted judgment procedure must be followed."'127 The court
expanded on the concept of "substituted judgment," saying that if
a once-competent patient is no longer able to render an informed
decision, the court must make a substituted judgment on behalf of
the patient based on all the evidence.128 "[T]he court as decision-
maker must 'substitute itself as nearly as may be for the incompe-
tent, and . . . act upon the same motives and consideration as
would have moved her .... ' -129
In two cases heard by trial courts, pregnant women made de-
cisions with their feet. A brief account of the facts of these cases
raises visions of malevolent slavers pursuing Eliza and her baby
across the Ohio River's icy floes. In a Michigan case, when a wo-
man objected to a Caesarean section on religious grounds, the
court authorized the police to find her and transport her to the
125. 533 A.2d at 612. The court stated:
Complex issues-legal, moral and religious--are presented, and courts,
though they must under present circumstances, are often hard pressed
to arrive at a right answer. The courts do, however, make the final
mortal decision. This is, in itself, probably the best that can be said of
the process. It would be far better if, by legislation, these bio-ethical
decisions could be made by duly constituted and informed ethical
groups within the health care system, and if desired, appellate review
as provided in other administrative proceedings. In this way, the need
to attempt to inform judges of, to them, complex medical facts on very
short notice would be eliminated.
Id.
126. 573 A.2d 1235, 1242 (D.C. 1990).
127. Id. at 1247.
128. Id. at 1249.




hospital against her will.i 0 She went into hiding and later gave
birth normally at another hospital.131 In a New York case, a wo-
man purposefully travelled across town for her prenatal care be-
cause the hospital she chose had a reputation of restraint in
interfering with normal delivery processes. 3 2 After her physician
diagnosed hypertension and preeclampsia and obtained a court or-
der for surgery, the woman successfully delivered at home with
the assistance of a midwife.133
3. Other Nonconsensual Medical Care
In a 1983 Massachusetts case, a husband, rather than a physi-
cian or hospital, requested the court to order medical care.l3M Dur-
ing Susan Taft's fourth month of pregnancy, her husband,
Lawrence, brought a pro se action requesting that the court force
his wife to undergo a surgical "purse string" operation to overcome
the problem of an incompetent cervix. 35 Ms. Taft had undergone
the procedure with three previous children.' 36 After a religious
conversion, however, she decided to trust in Jesus Christ rather
than surgeons.137 The trial court ruled that the commonwealth
had an interest which justified overriding the woman's right to
free exercise of religion. 3 8 The state's interest, the court said, is
"a fundamental and traditional interest in the physicial and
mental health of all parents, their children already born and their
unborn children."'139
The appeals court reversed, finding that the medical cirum-
stances were not so compelling as to justify curtailing Ms. Taft's
privacy and first amendment rights.140 The court noted the uncer-
tain medical prognosis and the age of the fetus. "No case has been
cited to us," the court said, "nor have we found one, in which a
court ordered a pregnant woman to submit to a surgical procedure
in order to assist in carrying a child not then viable to term."141
Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re-
130. Rhoden, supra note 77, at 2004. (citing In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004, slip
op. at 9 (Jackson County, Mich. Probate Ct. May 24, 1982)).
131. Id. at 2004 n.272 (citing Detroit Free Press, June 16, 1982, at 3A, col. 4).
132. Rhoden, supra note 77, at 2028 n.389 (citing North Central Bronx Hosp. v.
Headley, No. 1992-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 1986)).
133. Id. at 2028; see also id. at 2012 n.292.
134. Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983).
135. Id. at 332, 446 N.E.2d at 396.
136. Id., 446 N.E.2d at 396.
137. Id. at 333, 446 N.E.2d at 396.
138. Id., 446 N.E.2d at 396.
139. Id., 446 N.E.2d at 396.
140. Id. at 334, 446 N.E.2d at 397.
141. Id. at n.4, 446 N.E.2d at 397 n.4.
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fused to order Susan Taft to submit to surgery, lower courts else-
where have not exercised the same restraint in ordering medical
care-care which some might view as less physically intrusive than
forced major surgery. In California, a mother was convicted of
child endangerment for keeping two children on a macrobiotic diet
which had damaged the younger child.142 The appeals court, find-
ing the lower court's order that the mother not become pregnant
too restrictive, approved intensive monitoring of her diet if she be-
came pregnant again.143 A Michigan appeals court required a
pregnant diabetic to take insulin in spite of religious objections.144
Monitoring medication and diet, although less physically intrusive
than surgery or a transfusion, requires close supervision for an ex-
tended period of time. Policing a woman's behavior throughout
pregnancy requires an intrusion at least as great, if not greater,
than one-time surgery.
When pregnancy is not a factor, the law does not require one
person to submit to surgery to aid another, even with an over-
whelming public interest in the preservation of individual life.145
A Pennsylvania court wrote a seething opinion when one cousin
suffering from aplastic anemia sought an order to compel another
cousin to donate bone marrow to treat his disease.146 The court
viewed the cousin's refusal to donate morally indefensible, but
would not legally compel him to donate.147 The court discussed
our society's respect for the individual as its first principle:
For a society which respects the rights of one individual, to
sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its mem-
bers and suck from it sustenance for another member, is re-
volting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence.
Forceable extraction of living body tissue causes revulsion to
the judicial mind. Such would raise the spectre of the swastika
and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this
142. People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1984).
143. Id.
144. Rhoden, supra note 77, at 1954 n.15 (citing In re Unborn Baby Wilson, No.
81-108 AV (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1981)).
145. Lawrence Nelson, Brian Buggy & Carol Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of
Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest", 37 Has-
tings L.J. 703, 756 (1986).
There is a "public interest" in protecting every person in need of aid
and preserving his life that is "precisely analogous to the public inter-
est in saving the fetus," yet we do not force other potential Samaritans
to render aid. It would be utterly anomalous to rely on the state or
public interest to preserve the fetus' life in the situation of a woman
refusing medical treatment and yet ignore it in other situations.
Id. (quoting Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569, 1607
(1979)).
146. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978).
147. Id.
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portends.1 4 8
The law will not mandate organ donations from one person to
another, nor will it require donations from cadavers in order to
benefit the lives of those waiting for transplants.149 Thus, the fam-
ily of a deceased person can deny body parts that could benefit sev-
eral persons.150 What hierarchy of values are the courts reflecting
when they order surgery on pregnant women but not on corpses?
Courts often consider risks to the pregnant woman when de-
ciding whether to order surgery. If the court decides it is reason-
able for the woman to assume the risks, an assessment most likely
based on evidence presented by medical personnel, it may order
the woman to take that risk. When courts force pregnant women
to undergo medical care that exposes them to any degree of risk,
the legal system is imposing a duty required of no other person.
"Parents have a duty to rescue their children-i.e., to be basic
Good Samaritans-but they have no duty to be 'Splendid Samari-
tans,' embarking upon rescues that risk their life or health."' 5 '
The coerciveness of court-ordered medical care raises one last
question: how much force are the medical profession and the legal
system prepared to use to enforce these court orders? Whether a
woman quietly bows to a court's order, is forcibly anesthetized in
the hospital,152 or hides from the police,153 the process injects an
148. Id. at 92 (emphasis in original).
149. Lawrence Nelson & Nancy Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Preg-
nant Women: Life, Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 J. A.M.A. 1060, 1065 (1988).
The American Council on Transplantation estimates that of more than
23,000 potential cadaver organ donors available yearly, only 3,000
(about 13%) actually become donors. We see no good reason why
pregnant women should be treated with less respect than corpses. In
fact, it seems bizarre that many persons should die for want of a vital
organ that could be taken from a corpse, while a living pregnant wo-
man can be forced to undergo major surgery that exposes her to a not
insubstantial risk of harm or death.
Id. at 1065. But see Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (ordering a kidney
transplant from "mentally defective" man to his brother due in part to the donor's
emotional dependence on his brother).
150. See Nelson & Milliken, supra note 149, at 1065.
151. Nancy Rhoden, Cesareans and Samaritans, 15 Law, Med. & Health Care
118, 121 (1987) (using Judith Jarvis Thomson's well-known "Splendid Samaritan"
term).
152. See Nat'l Health Law Program, supra note 78, at 1068 (citing Ronna Jurow
& Richard Paul, Cesarean Delivery for Fetal Distress Without Maternal Consent,
63 Obstetrics & Gynecology 596 (1984)).
In a case arising at the Los Angeles County/USC Medical Center, the
judicial time frame was even shorter-in fact, it was nonexistent.
When the fetus of a 20-year-old, unmarried woman with no prenatal
care began to demonstrate an irregular heartbeat during labor, the
doctors informed the mother that a Cesarean was necessary for her
welfare and for that of the fetus. Although the woman refused the
procedure, the doctors ignored her continued protest and performed
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unseemly element of overt or covert violence into the physician-
patient relationship. Medical personnel may achieve immediate
goals by using courts to gain permission to force certain treatment
and they may avoid later liability,154 but at what cost? The long-
term result to a relationship ideally between allies can only be
mistrust. This mistrust may lead women who most desparately
need the support and advice of a physician to seek the least prena-
tal care.
III. Fetal Rights Now Recognized by Law
Legal intervention injects an atmosphere of antipathy into
the physician-patient relationship. Moreover, such intervention ul-
timately may make the maternal-fetal relationship an adversarial
one.
The Crack Baby law presents the issue of whether a fetus has
a legal right to be free of the dangers of maternal drug use or if
fetal health should be a social norm enforced in other ways. At
this time the law recognizes fetal rights selectively, primarily in
the law of property and tort.155
Early common law limited recognition of rights of the unborn
to the right to inherit property, that is, the right of the heir in
utero to receive its share of a decedent's property.156 Blackstone
wrote in 1762 that an "infant in its mother's womb" is considered a
person for purposes of inheritance.157
the emergency surgery. The physicians reported that "no force was
necessary" to anesthetize the patient.
Id.
153. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
154. Liability appears to have been a concern in In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C.
1987). The court stated:
The hospital had sought a declaratory order whether to intervene with
surgery given the mother's last-minute objection, an objection for
which there may have been one or more reasons. There were physi-
cians willing to operate and staff able to care for the fetus as needed.
With the competing legal interests of the mother (some of which
would survive her, e.g., D.C. Code § 16-2701 (1981)) and those of the
fetus or child, it is understandable why the hospital sought before-the-
fact judicial pronouncement of its duties.
Id. at 617 (citation omitted).
155. Robert Chabon, The Legal Status of the Unborn Child, J. Legal Med., May
1977, at 22 (citing 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *130 (1762)).
156. Id.
157. John Cribbet, Principles of the Law of Property 87 (2d ed. 1975) (quoting 2
William Blackstone, Commentaries *130 (1762)). Cribbet explains "the eagerness
with which the first heir was awaited, even by men with few of the normal fatherly
characteristics":
Blackstone demonstrates the learning on the subject. "The issue must
be born alive. Some have had a notion that it must be heard to cry;
but that is a mistake. Crying indeed is the strongest evidence of its be-
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Recovery in tort for injuries sustained before birth, a more
recent legal development, is generally contingent upon live
birth.15S Before 1946, courts in the United States did not recognize
a right to recover for injuries inflicted before birth, even for a live-
born child.159 In 1884, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Holmes, denied recovery for pre-
natal injury resulting in death of the fetus after the mother
slipped and fell on a negligently maintained road.160 The court de-
nied recovery because no precedent existed in the common law.'16
The child, the court added, was still part of the mother and if
there were damages to be recovered, they are recoverable by the
mother, not the child.162
Sixteen years after Holmes's opinion, the Illinois Supreme
Court denied recovery to a child injured as a result of injury to the
mother while she awaited birth in the hospital.' 63 The often-
quoted dissent in this case foreshadowed a change in the law. In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Boggs observed:
Medical science and skill and experience have demonstrated
that at a period of gestation in advance of the period of partu-
rition the fetus is capable of independent and separate life, and
that though within the body of the mother it is not merely a
part of her body, for her body may die in all of its parts and
the child remain alive and capable of maintaining life when
separated from the dead body of the mother. 164
Justice Boggs's thoughts were echoed in a majority opinion
decades later. In 1946, the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia decided Bonbrest v. Kotz,165 in which it held that an in-
jured child could bring an action to recover for prenatal injuries
sustained during birth.166 This change in the law quickly spread
ing born alive; but it is not the only evidence. The issue also must be
born during the life of the mother; for, if the mother dies in labour,
and the Caesarean operation is performed, the husband in this case
shall not be tenant by the curtesy: because, at the instant of the
mother's death, he was not clearly entitled, as having had no issue
born, but the land descended to the child, while he was yet in his
mother's womb; and the estate, being once vested, shall not afterwards
be taken from him."
Id. at 87 (quoting 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *127-28).
158. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 45, § 55 at 368.
159. Id.
160. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 17.
163. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
164. Id. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
165. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
166. Id.
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throughout the country.167 The majority in Bonbrest said that con-
sidering the viable child as part of its mother is a "contradiction in
terms.... Modern medicine is replete with cases of living children
being taken from [their] dead mothers."168 The living child now
may maintain an action against third parties for the consequences
of prenatal injuries.169 In some jurisdictions this cause of action
may be limited to a fetus capable of independent life at the time of
injury170 or, alternatively, to a fetus who is "quick."171 The fetus
also may have a cause of action for wrongful death in some juris-
dictions.172 Here the cause of action passes on to the estate's per-
sonal representative.173
In one case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a child
could bring an action for a negligent act which took place eight
years before she was conceived.174 Physicians had transfused the
mother, who had Rh-negative blood, with Rh-positive blood and
had not disclosed the mistake.175 When the young woman's an-
tibodies later caused disease in her fetus, the court held that the
plaintiff's existence was a foreseeable event and allowed the child
to recover for her injuries.176
Tort recovery for injuries to the fetus is normally limited to
the liability of third parties. 177 American courts in the nineteenth
century adopted a rule which allowed no actions between a parent
and a minor child for intentional or negligent torts.178 The paren-
tal immunity doctrine is based on the belief that legal actions be-
tween a parent and child would not only disturb family peace, but
also interfere with the parents' role as disciplinarians of the
child.179
One Michigan case, involving a plaintiff's discolored teeth,
chipped away at the foundations of the parental immunity doc-
167. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 45, § 55, at 368.
168. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140.
169. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 45, § 55, at 368.
170. Id. at 368-69.
171. Id. "Quick" means the mother is "able to feel the fetal movements." Dor-
land's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1401 (27th ed. 1988). "Quickening" refers to
the first recognizable movements of the fetus (recognizable to the mother), appear-
ing usually from the sixteenth to the eighteenth week of pregnancy. Id.
172. Note, Tort Recovery for the Unborn Child, 15 J. Faro. L. 277, 283-85 (1976-
77).
173. Id.
174. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 357, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977).
175. Id. at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
176. Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
177. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 45, § 122, at 904-05.
178. Id. § 122, at 904.
179. Id. § 122, at 905.
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trine. In Grodin v. Grodin,180 the mother took the antibiotic tetra-
cycline early in pregnancy, a time when the drug can discolor
developing tooth enamel in the fetus. The child's attorney found
facts supporting a claim of negligence against the mother. After
discovering that the mother's homeowner's policy insured against
tort liability, the attorney named both her and her attending phy-
sician as defendants. 8 1 The child charged the mother with negli-
gent failure to get a pregnancy test at the proper time and
negligent failure to inform her doctor that she was taking tetracy-
cline. 8 2 The court found that the child had a cause of action
against her mother and held that the mother had a duty to act
with "'reasonable exercise of parental discretion.' "183
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned a decision in
which the appellate court restricted the parental immunity doc-
trine in order to allow a parent-child tort action.'l 4 In a case in
which the plaintiff child alleged prenatal damage caused by the
mother's negligence in driving her car, the lower court held that
the parental immunity doctrine should not be applied to defeat the
child's cause of action in negligence against the mother. 85 In re-
versing, the supreme court observed:
There are far-reaching issues of public policy inherent in the
question whether to recognize a cause of action in tort for ma-
ternal prenatal negligence. Judicial scrutiny into the day-to-
day lives of pregnant women would involve an unprecedented
intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of the citizens of this
State.'8 6
After holding that no cause of action would lie for maternal prena-
tal negligence, the court emphasized that the opinion in "no way
minimize[s] the public policy favoring healthy newborns. Preg-
180. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
181. Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 870. But for an insurance policy, the mother in
Grodin would not have been named a defendant:
During discovery the physician claimed that he had warned the
mother to stop taking tetracycline. To guard against the possibility
that the jury might ascribe the child's injury to the mother and refuse
to award damages, the attorney advised amending the complaint to in-
clude the mother as a defendant, because a homeowner's policy in-
sured the mother against tort liability. But for the existence of a
homeowner's insurance policy with broad coverage, the suit against
the mother would not have been filed.
Robertson, supra note 102, at 441 n.114.
182. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
183. Id. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870 (quoting Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199
N.W.2d 169, 179 (1972)).
184. Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984), rev'd,
125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
185. Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984).
186. 125 Ill. 2d at 279-80, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
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nant women need access to information about the risks inherent in
everyday living on a developing fetus .... "187
Whatever one's religious or philosophical beliefs about the
personhood of the fetus, legal recognition is limited. Extending
legal rights of the fetus-particularly recognition as a person
under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution--could cause
far-reaching and untoward consequences. David Westfall, a profes-
sor of law at Harvard, discusses some of the possible effects of con-
stitutional personhood for fetuses in an article in which he
considers human life amendments introduced in Congress.l 88
Westfall infers that most of the amendments were introduced in
reaction to dictum in Roe v. Wade 189 in which the Court stated
that if fetuses were persons within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment, their "right to life would then be guaranteed specifi-
cally by the Amendment."' 90 An amendment guaranteeing per-
sonhood from conception could lead to several adverse results:
1. Congressional Elections - The fourteenth amendment requires
that congressional representatives be apportioned according to the
"whole number of persons in each State."191 "Persons" for pur-
poses of apportionment include many individuals who are not al-
lowed to vote. 192 If a fetus is a legal person, women at any stage of
pregnancy could be counted twice for census purposes- presuma-
bly three or more times for multiple gestations.
2. Federal Income Tax - Deductions for dependents are within
the power of Congress. If Congress allowed deductions for fetuses
as well as for children, tax benefits could theoretically cover two
187. Id. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
188. David Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The Potential Reach of a Human Life
Amendment, 8 Am. J. L. & Med. 97 (1982). Various human life amendments were
introduced during the 97th Congress. Westfall uses the term "conceptus" to avoid
value-laden terminology. He considers the extent of the rights of the fetus under
the proposed constitutional amendments.
If a conceptus is to be considered a "person" for purposes of the four-
teenth amendment, courts will have to determine the extent of its
rights. At least three alternative approaches could be followed: (1)
the only right of the conceptus is protection from destruction by abor-
tion; (2) the conceptus enjoys protection from any form of bodily in-
jury to the same extent as other persons, but no protection of property
rights or other non-bodily interests; and (3) the conceptus enjoys the
same rights as other persons, subject to legislative authority to adopt
reasonable classifications of persons.
Id. at 103.
189. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
190. Id. at 156-57.
191. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 2.
192. Westfall, supra note 188, at 108.
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years of taxable income, whether or not a live birth occurs.193
This could lead to a tax savings for an inexpensively maintained
dependent. Such tax savings, Westfall wryly notes, could be used
to fund a trip to a country where abortion is legal. 194
3. Inheritance - Live birth has been a requirement for inheri-
tance under the common law since at least 1830.195 Recognition of
fetal personhood would require a change in that rule of law.
Under a typical lapse statute, a fetus would be considered issue
surviving a deceased father.196 The mother would then inherit by
intestacy if the fetus dies after the father. Under a typical intes-
tacy statute, if a father is survived by a wife, a child, and a fetus,
and the fetus later miscarried, the mother would be heir to two
one-third shares of her husband's estate.197 The live child would
then receive less than its due share of the father's estate.
4. Gender-based Employment Discrimination - More fertile wo-
men could be excluded by employers from certain jobs on fetal
protection grounds rather than to protect the woman herself.198
5. Administrative Problems - Granting fetuses personhood would
require administrative resources. Since not all pregnancies end in
a live birth, it is not possible to keep track of the number of fe-
tuses by counting births and subtracting forty weeks. It would be
necessary to charge an agency with the responsibility of keeping
track of the fetal population. The government would have to rec-
ord the names and addresses of pregnant women along with re-
spective dates of conception. 199 Absent some form of voluntary
reporting by women, perhaps those interested in income tax de-
ductions, this would require massive governmental intrusion into
daily lives.
6. Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes - Such statutes would be ap-
plicable from the date of conception. A woman could face legal
consequences for her actions even before she knows she is preg-
nant. After she is visibly pregnant she would risk being reported
193. Id. at 112.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 128.
196. See id. at 128-29.
197. Id. at 129. "Thus an incentive would be created for women to assert that
they were pregnant with the conceptus of an intestate decedent when he died, and
that the conceptus did not miscarry until after his death." Id.
198. This form of discrimination exists now. See Note, The Evolution of the
Right to Privacy After Roe v. Wade, 13 Am. J. L. & Med. 493, 521-24 (1987); see also
Note, Title VII and Exclusionary Employment Practices: Fertile and Pregnant Wo-
men Need Not Apply, 17 Rutgers L.J. 95, 122-23 (1985).
199. See Westfall, supra note 188, at 132-33.
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to the local welfare agency or police department by persons man-
dated to report by statute or those who "voluntarily report" as
under the Minnesota child abuse statute.200
7. Changes in Medical Care - Recognizing a fetus as a "person"
from the time of conception could greatly affect choices in medical
care. Methods of birth control which prevent implantation after
fertilization such as intrauterine devices and "morning-after" pills
could be banned.201 Early surgical intervention to increase the
margin of safety for the woman in the case of tubal or ectopic
pregnancies or in situations where spontaneous miscarriage is im-
minent could leave physicians liable for fetal homicide.20 2 More-
over, if the health of the woman and the fetus are of equal
concern, would a woman suffering from cancer have to forego
chemotherapy or radiation therapy until she either miscarries or
gives birth? Conversely, the woman may no longer be able to re-
fuse drugs and therapies benefitting the fetus but not the woman.
IV. Line-Drawing as Technology Advances
Might the precedent set by the Crack Baby law lead to more
governmental monitoring of pregnant women in the future? Until
a relatively short time ago, medicine had no way to monitor preg-
nancy and legal institutions had no will. The law was concerned
merely with reproduction to the extent of forbidding abortion-
and in some states contraception-and to condoning forced sterili-
zation of "defectives." "The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes,"
Justice Holmes noted in Buck v. Bell because "three generations of
200. See id. at 117. Westfall also addresses a pregnant woman's simple freedom
to move about:
The interests of the conceptus will often diverge from those of the wo-
man .... From the standpoint of the conceptus, a passive carrier who
exposes it to the minimum risk of miscarriage or prenatal injury is
preferred. She should not smoke, drink, or use any drugs with possi-
ble adverse effects on the conceptus. Coffee may be interdicted. Ski-
ing, working in hazardous environments, flying, and riding in
automobiles might be prohibited for such women in order to minimize
possible adverse effects on the conceptus. Indeed, the Victorian re-
gime for upper-class pregnant women that minimizes activities either
inside or outside the home might be ideal. Restricting the activities of
potentially pregnant women might similarly be justified on the ground
that such classification is necessary to protect the conceptus during the
period between conception and proof of pregnancy.
Id. at 110-11.
201. Id. at 117.
202. George Ryan, Jr., Medical Implications of Bestowing Personhood on the Un-
born, in Defining Human Life: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Implications 84, 85-86
(Margery Shaw & A. Edward Doudera eds. 1983).
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imbeciles are enough." 203 Now, however, the courts are signifi-
cantly involved in reproductive issues, beginning with the striking
down of a statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to mar-
ried people in Griswold v. Connecticut.20 4
Advances in medical knowledge can be used to enhance or to
limit the liberty rights of women. George Annas, a professor of
law at Boston University, sees Griswold and Roe v. Wade 205 as sit-
uations in which the court used medical advances to enhance the
liberty rights of women.2 "6 In the forced-Caesarean cases, on the
other hand, he sees "the potential dark side of technology":20 7
Here medical advances, including ultrasound, fetal monitoring,
safer cesarean sections, and neonatal intensive care units were
used not to enhance the rights of pregnant women, but instead
to provide an excuse to ignore them, by concentrating exclu-
sively on the potential child. The lesson these cases teach is
that technology untempered by human rights can lead to bru-
tal dehumanization of pregnant women.
2 08
What constitutes appropriate obstetrical care is necessarily a
fluid concept.209 In fact, the use of existing technology can change
the medical standard of care. If most physicians routinely use fetal
monitors during labor, for example, the physician who does not
use a monitor may be exposed to increased risk of liability.210
203. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (citing Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1904)).
204. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
205. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
206. Annas, supra note 112, at 216-18.
207. Id. at 226.
208. Id.
209. See Richard Wertz & Dorothy Wertz, Lying-In: A History of Childbirth in
America 29-73 (1977). The authors trace the history of childbirth practices in Eu-
rope before the settlement of the American colonies through the "natural" child-
birth movement in the 1970s. They discuss, among other things, the puerperal
fever iatropidemic and Oliver Wendell Holmes's writing on the subject; "Twilight
Sleep" labor and delivery using the hallucinogenic drug scopolamine; and some
rather perverted hospital-centered practices during the 1940s and 1950s. They end
their book with a plea for not only good, but the best, prenatal and obstetrical care
for women of all economic circumstances.
210. If there is an iatropidemic of Caesarean sections taking place, it may be
caused in part by a perceived epidemic of litigation. Alexander Capron discusses
the influence of fetal monitoring on the Caesarean section rate:
If fetal monitoring is used inappropriately-for example, if it goes
from being a screening technique used to warn of possible danger to
being substituted for physicians' and nurses' clinical judgment-unnec-
essary operations may occur, resulting in needless harm to women
during labor. Yet once a technique such as EFM [Electronic Fetal
Monitoring] has been widely adopted it is very difficult for a physician
in a litigation-conscious world to resist using it even if statistically it is
likely to cause more net harm, especially when the harm spreads out
in relatively small increments over a large population while the harm
avoided would fall dramatically on a few people.
MINNESOTA'S "CRACK BABY" LAW
Some legal academicians would impose a duty of care on the wo-
man to the point where she would function as little more than a
"fetal container" once she became pregnant.2 11
The woman's duty of care would include submitting to a vari-
ety of tests and procedures to ensure the best possible outcome for
the fetus in light of current or future technology. The advocates of
the technological imperative ("if it can be invented, it must be
used") are troubled by the trimester analysis of Roe v. Wade.212
To overcome the argument that a woman has a right to privacy in
early pregnancy, the writers find an implied waiver of that right
once a woman passes that variable point in pregnancy where the
fetus is viable. Some examples of their views are:
" Conflicts over management of the pregnancy arise only af-
ter [the woman] has decided to become or remain pregnant.
Once she decides to forgo abortion and the state chooses to
protect the fetus, the woman loses the liberty to act in ways
that would adversely affect the fetus.2 1 3
" When a woman has chosen not to obtain an abortion, the
state should be able to assert its right to prohibit conduct
likely to result in injury in utero.2 1 4
* It will take courage to reverse the well-established legal
presumption that the mother's rights transcend those of
the fetus. This presumption should hold only if the fetus
does not become a living child.2 1 5
Those who promote active state protection of the fetus after a wo-
man's "waiver" of abortion do not dwell on the fact that many wo-
Alexander Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 618,
668-69 (1979); accord Jane McCusker, Donald Harris & David Hosmer, Jr., Associa-
tion of Electronic Fetal Monitoring During Labor with Cesarean Section Rate and
with Neonatal Morbidity and Mortality, 78 Am. J. Pub. Health 1170, 1173 (1988)
(concluding that "EFM has contributed to increasing cesarean section rate in this
country .... Although some evidence supports benefits of EFM to high-risk
pregnancies, the bulk of the evidence from studies of lower-risk pregnancies ...
provide[s] little evidence of benefit"). Compare Kirkwood Shy, David Luthy, For-
rest Bennett, Michael Whitfield, Eric Larson, Gerald van Belle, James Hughes,
Judith Wilson & Morton Stenchever, Fffects of Electronic Fetal-Heart-Rate Moni-
toring, as Compared with Periodic Auscultation, on the Neurological Development
of Premature Infants, 322 New Eng. J. Med. 588, 593 (1990) ("The study suggests
that clinicians should be attentive to potentially adverse outcomes associated with
[EFM.... [A]s compared with a structured protocol of periodic fetal auscultation,
[EFM] did not improve the neurologic development of children born
prematurely.").
211. George Annas, Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, Hastings Center Rep.,
Dec. 1986, at 13.
212. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
213. Robertson, supra note 102, at 437.
214. Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for
the Fetus, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1209, 1223 (1987).




men, for reasons of ethics or religion, would not consider aborting
under any circumstances. Many women "waive" their right to
abortion because they live in rural areas with no abortion facilities
or because they have no money to pay for the procedure. Loss of
liberty is the penalty for those women who remain pregnant,
whatever their reasons.
After "waiving" her right to privacy, some fetal rights advo-
cates would require that the pregnant woman submit to medical
interventions that might aid the fetus.216 John Robertson, a pro-
fessor of law at the University of Texas, would have a pregnant
woman submit to surgery on the fetus in utero:
The fact that the mother must undergo surgery as part of the
fetal therapy procedure would be no defense if the procedure
did not present an undue risk to her life or health. She waived
her right to resist bodily intrusions made for the sake of the
fetus when she chose to continue pregnancy.
The more difficult question would be whether the ther-
apy could be directly imposed on her against her will. Would
her interest in bodily integrity override the unborn child's in-
terest in life and health? Bodily intrusions for the sake of an-
other are highly disfavored, but are not unknown to the law.
If the risk to the mother is slight and the benefit to the child is
great, there are precedents that would authorize a court to or-
der treatment against the mother's will....
... Once the fetus reaches viability and the mother no
longer has the right to abort, more intrusive or risky interven-
tions could be justified.217
Robertson then cites the Raleigh-Fitkin 218 transfusion case and
the Jefferson 219 Caesarean section cases as precedents for forced
treatment. He would make a mother's refusal of fetal therapy the
basis for civil suit or criminal prosecution if her refusal "resulted
in death or injury to the fetus."220
John E.B. Myers, professor of law at McGeorge, University of
the Pacific, urges that courts construe existing child abuse statutes
to include the fetus:
Recent years have witnessed remarkable advances in prenatal
medicine and fetal surgery. As medical science achieves
greater ability to treat unborn children, demand for such care
will grow. At the same time, cases will occur where parents
216. Robertson, supra note 102, at 444, 447.
217. Id. at 444-45, 447.
218. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
219. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981).
220. Robertson, supra note 102, at 444.
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unjustifiably refuse to consent to care. Interpeting child abuse
and neglect statutes to include the unborn will enable courts
to override parental objection in appropriate cases. In an age
when medicine can treat and cure the unborn child, society
will not tolerate a complete vacuum of authority to provide
care in compelling cases.22 1
Margery Shaw, professor of medical genetics and community
medicine at the University of Texas, recommends testing pregnant
women for substance abuse and ordering confinement if necessary.
An analogy to fetal abuse would suggest that health care pro-
fessionals and others could be required, by properly drawn
statutes, to report both potential and actual fetal abuse. Fur-
thermore, such statutes could give the courts broad authority
to compel parents and prospective parents to enter alcohol and
drug abuse rehabilitation programs, and, in the extreme, to
take "custody" of the fetus to prevent mental and physical
harm.222
Jeffrey Parness, professor of law at Northern Illinois Univer-
sity, advocates confinement of pregnant substance abusers. Since
he has a strong interest in preventing handicaps, he would also
mandate genetic testing:
There is also an arguable case for state custody of both males
and females of childbearing age for the purpose of conducting
genetic tests geared to providing information about the pro-
spective [sic] of preventable handicaps-particularly where the
tests are not very intrusive and where the means of prevention
are available and easily employed.223
Parness believes that a genetic test with negative implications and
"[riecognition of an unborn's interest in not being born with severe
handicaps could thus be encouraged by state financial support of
the prospective parent's desire to abort."224 State support could
also be used for amniocentesis or surgery leading to sterility.
22 s
Shaw would add legal penalties for those parents who choose
not to abort if they learn of a potential defect in the fetus through
genetic testing.226
[A]s reproductive alternatives proliferate, parents may face the
option of refraining from ordinary conception and childbirth,
utilizing methods to circumvent abuse to their prospective
221. John Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn.- Can the State Intervene?, 23
Duq. L. Rev. 1, 30-31 (1984). Among other procedures, Meyers mentions chorionic
villus biopsy, which could permit diagnosis of certain fetal abnormalities as early as
the sixth week of pregnancy. Id. at 30 n.141.
222. Shaw, supra note 215, at 100.
223. Jeffrey Parness, The Duty to Prevent Handicaps: Laws Promoting the Pre-
vention of Handicaps to Newborns, 5 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 431, 461 (1983).
224. Id. at 462.
225. Id.
226. Shaw, supra note 215, at 111.
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children, remaining childless, or facing civil or criminal
charges if they negligently or purposefully bring defective fe-
tuses to term when, by reasonable behavior, they could have
avoided such a tragedy.22 7
Writers of the Robertson-Shaw ilk are persuasive writers in influ-
ential positions who would use a monstrous medical-state appara-
tus as a means to utopian ends. But their means are unrealistic in
a society that values individual liberty. Justice Blackmun ob-
served that Supreme Court cases have long "recognized that the
Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of
individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of govern-
ment.... That promise extends to women as well as to men."
228
The condition of pregnancy should not alter this promise.
V. Conclusion
The Crack Baby law appears at a time when the medical and
legal communities are both more able and more willing than ever
before to interfere with a pregnant woman's right to self-manage-
ment. The law broods at the crossroads of ability and will and pro-
ceeds with the purported purpose of doing "something" about the
problem of prenatal substance abuse.2 29 Looking at this purpose in
a purely utilitarian light leads one to ask how much exactly of the
pregnant woman's freedom the state is prepared to sacrifice for
questionable benefits.
If the state interest in this law is promoting the health of the
fetus, driving women away from medical care until delivery is im-
minent is not going to achieve that end. If the state interest in this
law is conservation of resources-resources that damaged children
may require after birth-the statute and the accompanying appro-
priations arrive with too little too late. If the state interest is in
punishment or if the law is designed as a safety valve to release
some of the voters' anger, the Legislature may have achieved that
end.
Three requirements of the Crack Baby law may be discourag-
ing women who are most at-risk of complicated pregnancies from
seeking prenatal care.
First, the civil commitment provision is being used. As of
March 1, 1990, four women from Hennepin County were involun-
tarily committed and waited for delivery in a locked ward located
227. Id. at 100.
228. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986).
229. Lupo, supra note 14 (comment of Rep. Kathy Blatz).
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in a Twin Cities teaching hospital.230 They are receiving
treatment.
Second, until the Legislature makes technical amendments,
reports of prenatal substance abuse must be made to the police.231
Third, nonconsensual drug testing continues. It was the Leg-
islature's original intention, as understood by the bill's sponsors,
that a woman not be informed by her physician that her urine will
be tested for drugs and that she not be informed of what the con-
sequences of a positive test will be for her.232
The law mandates drug treatment for pregnant women other
than those who are civilly committed, but the Legislature provided
less than one million dollars for the counties to do so. 233 Three
treatment facilities funded by the Department of Health are lo-
cated in the urban areas of Minneapolis and St. Cloud.234 Karen
Ganley, director of one of these programs, Eden Day in Minneapo-
lis, sees two problems with the Crack Baby reporting law. She
says there are only about thirty-five treatment beds in the state
that can accommodate women with children, and because women
fear losing their children, they are getting even less prenatal
care.235
230. Telephone interview with Evelyn Lund, Hennepin County Probate Court
(Feb. 27, 1990).
231. Lupo, supra note 14. Sponsors of the bill indicated that they plan to fine-
tune the law in the next legislative session. Id. Technical amendments may in-
clude the following changes:
1. an elimination of the requirement that prenatal substance abuse
be reported to the police;
2. a clarification of the number of drugs listed. Schedules I, II, and
III consist of hundreds of drugs, including marijuana and prescrip-
tion drugs. The law was not aimed at use of marijuana, the spon-
sors say, and the law should be changed to restrict the mandated
reporting to the five street drugs: cocaine, heroin, PCP, ampheta-
mine, methamphetamine;
3. a clarification of the physician's duty to test and report without
consent of the patient. There may be a conflict with the Data
Practices Act, and the Legislature intended that the woman being
tested not be informed.
Non-technical amendments may include the addition of alco-
hol to the reporting requirement.
Id. Senator Ember Reichgott, the Senate sponsor of the bill, believes that the com-
mitment provisions of this statute will be challenged on due process grounds. Id.
232. Id. (comments of Rep. Kathy Blatz).
233. Id.
234. The facilities are: Turning Point and Eden Day in Minneapolis, Minnesota
and Journey Home in St. Cloud, Minnesota. These are pilot projects to provide
treatment for pregnant women or women with children. Telephone interview with
Pam Young, Minnesota Dep't of Health and Human Serv., St. Paul, Minnesota
(Jan. 2, 1990).
235. Daniel Anderson, Drug Program Treats Mother but Doesn't Take Away Her
Baby, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Apr. 24, 1990, at 2E, col. 3.
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Without prenatal care, there can be no early intervention to
treat a woman's addiction. Drugs and alcohol can have detrimen-
tal effects on the developing fetus even before the woman knows
that she is pregnant. One study on cocaine use published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association found that
neurobehavioral deficiencies were present in infants who were ex-
posed to cocaine during the first trimester of pregnancy only.23
The authors of the study conclude that early intervention in preg-
nancy can result in "improved obstetric and neonatal outcome" 237
but that prevention and education programs are imperative in or-
der to reach all women of childbearing age.2 3 8
The Crack Baby law mandates educational programs in the
public schools, aimed particularly at those who may be at high risk
of pregnancy coupled with controlled substance or alcohol use.239
Mass education about the dangers of chemical use during preg-
nancy and mass education concerning the needs for birth control
for those who are addicted may in the end be the only state action
which does not threaten the personal autonomy and privacy of any
woman who becomes pregnant.
The dangers inherent in the Crack Baby law go beyond the
context of illegal or controlled drug abuse. The legislators have
set a precedent for state intervention in the lives of pregnant wo-
men which may in the future weave a trap that will entangle all
women-not just women exposed by necessity to the social welfare
236. Ira Chasnoff, Dan Griffith, Scott MacGregor, Kathryn Dirkes & Kayreen
Burns, Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use in Pregnancy: Perinatal Outcome, 261 J.
A.M.A. 1741 (1989).
237. Id. at 1744.
238. Id.
239. Minn. Stat. § 121.883 (Supp. 1989).
Program for Public Education Regarding the Effects of Controlled
Substance and Alcohol Use During Pregnancy.
Subdivision 1. Public education regarding the effects of con-
trolled substance and alcohol use during pregnancy. The commis-
sioner of education, in consultation with the commissioner of health,
shall assist school districts in development and implementing pro-
grams to prevent and reduce the risk of harm to unborn children ex-
posed to controlled substance and alcohol use by their mother during
pregnancy. Each district program must, at a minimum:
(1) use planning materials guidelines, and other technically accurate
and updated information;
(2) maintain a comprehensive, technically accurate, and updated
curriculum;
(3) be directed at adolescents, especially those who may be at high
risk of pregnancy coupled with controlled substance or alcohol use;
(4) provide in-service training for appropriate district staff; and
(5) collaborate with appropriate state and local agencies and
organizations.
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system-but judges, physicians, or the governor herself. Are these




1989 Minn. Laws Ch. 290, Art. 5
"An Act relating to crime - H.F. No. 59
Additions in text are indicated by underline; deletions by strike-
outs. Sec. 2 Minnesota Statutes 1988, section 253B.02, subdivision
2, is amended to read:
SUBD. 2. CHEMICALLY DEPENDENT PERSON. "Chemically
dependent person" means any person (a) determined as being inca-
pable of self-management or management of personal affairs by
reason of the habitual and excessive use of alcohol or drugs, and
(b) whose recent conduct as a result of habitual and excessive use
of alcohol or drugs poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm
to self or others as demonstrated by (i) a recent attempt of threat
to physically harm self or others, (ii) evidence of recent serious
physical problems, or (iii) a failure to obtain necessary food, cloth-
ing, shelter, or medical care.
"Chemically dependent person" also means a pregnant woman
who has engaged during the pregnancy in habitual or excessive
use, for a nonmedical purpose, of any of the following controlled
substances or their derivatives: cocaine, heroin, phencyclidine
[PCP], methamphetamine, or amphetamine.
Sec. 3 Minnesota Statutes 1988, section 253B.02, subdivision 10, is
amended to read:
SUBD. 10. INTERESTED PERSON. "Interested person" means an
adult, including but not limited to, a public official, including a lo-
cal welfare agency acting under section 5, and the legal guardian,
spouse, parent, legal counsel, adult child, next of kin, or other per-
son designated by a proposed patient.
Sec. 4 Minnesota Statutes 1988, section 626.556, subdivision 2, is
amended to read:
SUBD. 2. DEFINITIONS. As used in this section, the following
terms have the meanings given them unless the specific content
indicates otherwise:
(c) "Neglect" means failure by a person responsible for a child's
care to supply a child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or
medical care when reasonably able to do so or failure to protect a
child from conditions or actions which imminently and seriously
endanger the child's physical or mental health when reasonably
able to do so. Nothing in this section shall be construed to (1)
mean that a child is neglected solely because the child's parent,
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guardian, or other person responsible for the child's care in good
faith selects and depends upon spiritual means or prayer for treat-
ment or care of disease or remedial care of the child, or (2) impose
upon persons, not otherwise legally responsible for providing a
child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, a duty
to provide that care. "Neglect" includes prenatal exposure to a
controlled substance, as defined in section 5, used by the mother
for a nonmedical purpose, as evidenced by withdrawal symptoms
in the child at birth, results of a toxicology test performed on the
mother at delivery or the child at birth, or medical effects or de-
velopmental delays during the child's first year of life that medi-
cally indicate prenatal exposure to a controlled substance. Neglect
also means "medical neglect" as defined in section 260.015. subdivi-
sion -10 2a, clause (e (5).
Sec. 5 626.5561 REPORTING OF PRENATAL EXPOSURE TO
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
SUBDMSION 1. REPORTS REQUIRED. A person mandated to
report under section 626.556, subdivision 3, shall immediately re-
port to the local welfare agency if the person knows or has reason
to believe that a woman is pregnant and has used a controlled sub-
stance for a nonmedical purpose during the pregnancy. Any per-
son may make a voluntary report if the person knows or has
reason to believe that a woman is pregnant and has used a con-
trolled substance for a nonmedical purpose during the pregnancy.
SUBD. 2. LOCAL WELFARE AGENCY. If the report alleges a
pregnant woman's use of a controlled substance for a nonmedical
purpose, the local welfare agency shall immediately conduct an ap-
propriate assessment and offer services indicated under the cir-
cumstances. Services offered may include, but are not limited to, a
referral for chemical dependency assessment, a referral for chemi-
cal dependency treatment if recommended, and a referral for pre-
natal care. The local welfare agency may also take any
appropriate action under chapter 253B, including seeking an emer-
gency admission under 253B.05. The local welfare agency shall
seek an emergency admission under section 253B.05 if the preg-
nant woman refuses recommended voluntary services or fails rec-
ommended treatment.
SUBD. 3. RELATED PROVISIONS. Reports under this section
are governed by section 626.556, subdivisions 4, 4a, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 11.
SUBD. 4. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. For purposes of this
section and section 6, "controlled substances" means a controlled
substance classified in schedule I, II, or III under chapter 152.
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Sec. 6. 626.5562 TOXICOLOGY TESTS REQUIRED.
SUBDIVISION 1. TEST; REPORT. A physician shall administer a
toxicology test to a pregnant woman under the physician's care to
determine whether there is evidence that she has ingested a con-
trolled substance, if the woman has obstetrical complications that
are a medical indication of possible use of a controlled substance
for a nonmedical purpose. If the test results are positive, the phy-
sician shall report the results under section 5. A negative test re-
sult does not eliminate the obligation to report under section 5, if
other evidence gives the physician reason to believe the patient has
used a controlled substance for a nonmedical purpose.
SUBD. 2. NEWBORNS. A physician shall administer to each new-
born infant born under the physician's care a toxicology test to de-
termine whether there is evidence of prenatal exposure to a
controlled substance, if the physician has reason to believe based
on a medical assessment of the mother or the infant that the
mother used a controlled substance for a nonrnedical purpose prior
to the birth. If the test results are positive, the physician shall re-
port the results as neglect under section 626.556. A negative test
result does not eliminate the obligation to report under section
626.556 if other medical evidence of prenatal exposure to a con-
trolled substance is present.
SUBD. 3. REPORT TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. Physicians
shall report to the department of health the results of tests per-
formed under subdivisions 1 and 2. A report shall be made on Feb-
ruary 1 and August 1 of each year, beginning February 1, 1990.
The reports are medical data under section 13.41.
SUBD. 4. IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY. Any physician or other
medical personnel administering a toxicology test to determine the
presence of a controlled substance in a pregnant woman or in a
child at birth or during the first month of life is immune from civil
or criminal liability arising from administration of the test, if the
physician ordering the test believes in good faith that the test is
required under this section and the test is administered in accord-
ance with an established protocol and reasonable medical practice.
SUBD. 5. RELIABILITY OF TESTS. A positive test result re-
ported under this section must be obtained from a confirmatory
test performed by a drug testing laboratory licensed by the depart-
ment of health. The confirmatory test must meet the standards
established under section 181.953, subdivision 1, and the rules
adopted under it.
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Minn. Stat. § 253B.05 (1988)
EMERGENCY ADMISSION
SUBDIVISION 1. EMERGENCY HOLD. Any person may be admitted or
held for emergency care and treatment in a treatment facility with
the consent of the head of the treatment facility upon a written
statement by an examiner that: (1) he has examined the person
not more than 15 days prior to admission, (2) he is of the opinion,
for stated reasons, that the person is mentally ill, mentally re-
tarded or chemically dependent, and is in imminent danger of
causing injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained,
and (3) an order of the court cannot be obtained in time to prevent
the anticipated injury.
The statement shall be: (1) sufficient authority for a peace or
health officer to transport a patient to a treatment facility, (2)
stated in behavioral terms and not in conclusory language, and (3)
of sufficient specificity to provide an adequate record for review.
A copy of the statement shall be personally served on the person
immediately upon admission. A copy of the statement shall be
maintained by the treatment facility.
SUBD. 3 DURATION OF HOLD. Any person held pursuant to
this section may be held up to 72 hours, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays, after admission unless a petition for
the commitment of the person has been filed in the probate court
of the county of the person's residence or of the county in which
the facility is located and the court issues an order pursuant to sec-
tion 253B.07, subdivision 6. [§ 253B.07, Subd. 6, Apprehend and
hold orders.]
§ 253B.02 DEFINITIONS
SUBD. 7 ExAMINER. "Examiner" means a licensed physician
or a licensed consulting psychologist, knowledgeable, trained and
practicing in the diagnosis and treatment of the alleged
impairment.
§ 626.556 REPORTING OF MALTREATMENT OF MINORS
SUBD. 3. PERSONS MANDATED TO REPORT. A professional or
his delegate who is engaged in the practice of the healing arts, so-
cial services, hospital administration, psychological and psychiatric
treatment, child care, education, or law enforcement who has
knowledge of or reasonable cause to believe a child is being ne-
glected or physically or sexually abused shall immediately report
1990]
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the information to the local welfare agency, police department or
the county sheriff. [....]
Any person not required to report under the provisions of
this subdivision may voluntarily report to the local welfare agency,
police department or the county sheriff if he has knowledge of or
reasonable cause to believe a child is being neglected or subjected
to physical or sexual abuse. [...]
Minn. Stat. § 152.02 (1988)
SCHEDULES OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES; ADMINISTRATION OF
CHAPTER
Subdivision 1. There are established five schedules of con-
trolled substances, to be known as Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V.
Such schedules shall initially consist of the substances listed in
this section by whatever official name, common or usual name,
chemical name, or trade name designated.
Subd. 7. The board of pharmacy is authorized to regulate and
define additional substances which contain quantities of a sub-
stance possessing abuse potential in accordance with the following
criteria:
(1) The board of pharmacy shall place a substance in Sched-
ule I if it finds that the substance has: A high potential for abuse,
no currently accepted medical use in the United States, and a lack
of accepted safety for use under medical supervision.
(2) The board of pharmacy shall place a substance in Sched-
ule II if it finds that the substance has: A high potential for abuse,
currently accepted medical use in the United States, or currently
accepted medical use with severe restrictions, and that abuse may
lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.
(3) The board of pharmacy shall place a substance in Sched-
ule III if it finds that the substance has: A potential for abuse less
than the substances listed in Schedules I and II, currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States, and that abuse may
lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological
dependence.
Examples of drugs listed in Schedule I:
Heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide, marijuana, mescaline, peyote
[with an exception for members of the Native American Church].
Examples of drugs listed in Schedule 11:
Opium or opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or prepara-
tion of opium or opiate; coca leaves and any salt, compound, deriv-
ative, or preparation of coca leaves; Methadone, Amphetamine,
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Methamphetamine; Methaqualone, Secobarbital, Pentobarbital,
Phencyclidine.
Examples of drugs listed in Schedule III:
Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains
any quantity of Amphetamine... Methamphetamine, its salts, iso-
mers, and salts of isomers. Any material, compound, mixture, or
preparation which contains any quantity of [certain substances]
having potential for abuse associated with a depressant effect on
the central nervous system. These include: amobarbital,
secobarbital, pentobarbital, and any quantity of a derivative of bar-
bituric acid, except those substances listed in other schedules, e.g.
Lysergic acid. Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation
which contains any quantity of the following substances having a
potential for abuse associated with a stimulated effect on the cen-
tral nervous system. These include: Benzphetamine,
Chlorphentermine, Clortermine, Mazindol. Any material, com-
pound, mixture, or preparation containing limited quantities of...
codeine, dihydrocodeinone, ethylmorphine, opium, morphine.

